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+musharraf 's last act ?
+desperate to hold onto power , pervez musharraf has discarded pakistan 's constitutional framework and declared a state of emergency .
+his goal ?
+to stifle the independent judiciary and free media .
+artfully , though shamelessly , he has tried to sell this action as an effort to bring about stability and help fight the war on terror more effectively .
+nothing could be further from the truth .
+if pakistan 's history is any indicator , his decision to impose martial law may prove to be the proverbial straw that breaks the camel 's back .
+general musharraf appeared on the national scene on october 12 , 1999 , when he ousted an elected government and announced an ambitious " nation - building " project .
+many pakistanis , disillusioned with pakistan 's political class , remained mute , thinking that he might deliver .
+the september 11 , 2001 , terrorist attacks on america brought musharraf into the international limelight as he agreed to ditch the taliban and support the united states - led war on terror .
+musharraf clamped down on some religious militants operating inside pakistan and also on those fighting indian forces in kashmir .
+as a result , pakistan was rewarded with american financial assistance and arms .
+in furtherance of his re - alignment , musharraf sent the pakistani army into the tribal areas bordering afghanistan for the first time since pakistan 's independence .
+operations there against taliban and al-qaeda forces brought mixed results .
+although the us viewed musharraf as an agent of change , he has never achieved domestic political legitimacy , and his policies were seen as rife with contradictions .
+for example , he made alliances with islamist political forces ( who in 2004 voted for constitutional changes legitimizing his position and actions ) .
+at the same time , he sidelined moderate , mainstream political leaders while claiming that he stood for " enlightened moderation . "
+a series of ill - planned military operations in the tribal areas further complicated the situation in the volatile border region .
+last march , musharraf took his boldest step , removing the chief justice of the supreme court , iftikhar chaudhry .
+to the surprise of many , the country 's legal community organized a nation - wide movement to restore the chief justice to his post .
+hundreds of thousands of ordinary people demanded the rule of law and the supremacy of the constitution , emboldening the judiciary and changing the country 's political dynamic .
+in a historic ruling that musharraf had little choice but to accept , the supreme court itself reinstated the chief justice in july .
+subsequently , the energized judiciary continued ruling against government decisions , embarrassing the government -- especially its intelligence agencies .
+government officials were held accountable for actions that were usually beyond the reach of the law , ranging from brutal beatings of journalists , to illegal confinement for " national security . "
+musharraf and his political allies tried to adjust to this new reality , but their patience ran out when the supreme court took up petitions against musharraf 's decision to run for president .
+according to the constitution ( originally promulgated in 1973 by an elected parliament ) , a serving military official cannot run for an elected office .
+musharraf was not ready to give up his military post , but also wanted to be a civilian president .
+while he announced that he would leave his military position " if " he was elected president , his track record of reneging on his promises haunted the judiciary .
+the decision of the 11 - member bench might easily have gone against him .
+legally cornered , musharraf has now decided to abandon constitutionality , removing the leading judges of the supreme court and provincial high courts and putting curbs on the media .
+lawyers , human rights activists , and political leaders have since been arrested .
+there is widespread public resentment in response to these moves .
+rather than taking responsibility for the deteriorating security situation ( as evidenced by regular suicide bomb attacks ) and the increasing talibanization of the tribal areas , musharraf has tried to blame the judiciary and media .
+to be sure , in some cases , judicial activism was obvious ( though within the realm of constitutional law ) , and the media also made mistakes ; but by no stretch of the imagination can these be linked to religious extremism or support for militancy .
+it is unlikely that musharraf 's latest gambit will succeed , as his popular support is at its lowest ebb .
+pakistan 's armed forces -- repeated targets of suicide bombers -- have become demoralized .
+it is difficult to imagine them standing with musharraf should civil conflict erupt .
+nor can a weak , embattled , and disoriented musharraf be expected to fight islamic militancy effectively or bring political stability to pakistan .
+opposition political parties are drawing closer together , and former prime minister benazir bhutto , despite progress in her power - sharing negotiations with musharraf , has strongly condemned his actions .
+human rights bodies , media associations , and lawyers ' organizations are expected to defy the emergency , which will pit them against the security forces .
+terrorists may also benefit by attacking a preoccupied army and political forces aligned with musharraf .
+in the event of sustained protests and potential violence , top military commanders may decide to send musharraf home -- a decision that would not be unprecedented in pakistan 's chronically turbulent history .
+the making of a murder in pakistan
+the assassination of benazir bhutto , the first muslim woman to lead a muslim country , is a serious blow to pakistan 's prospects for democracy and , indeed , its viability as a state .
+as chaos and confusion set in , we should not lose sight of president pervez musharraf 's partial responsibility for this turn of events .
+at the very least , he cannot be absolved from his government 's failure to provide bhutto with adequate security .
+instead , bhutto had to pay with her life for courageously challenging extremists of all stripes -- from al-qaeda and taliban to the country 's religious political parties and military hardliners .
+as heir to zulfikar ali bhutto , the legendary democratic leader who was hanged by general muhammad zia - ul - haq 's government in 1979 , benazir emerged as a symbol of resistance at a young age -- but languished in jails and exile in the 1980 's .
+z. a. bhutto 's legacy was empowerment of the impoverished and defense of ordinary people 's rights amid feudalistic politics and military rule .
+rather than bowing to the military junta , he embraced the gallows .
+hours before his hanging , benazir was allowed to see her father for the last time , writing in her autobiography : " i told him on my oath in his death cell , i would carry on his work . "
+she largely lived up to the promise .
+her first stint as prime minister ( 1988-90 ) was brief and disorganized .
+lt. gen. hamid gul , the former inter - services intelligence ( isi ) chief , confirmed that he sponsored an alliance of right - wing political parties to stop her from getting a parliamentary majority .
+information about pakistan 's nuclear program and isi operations in afghanistan were out of her domain .
+her second term in office ( 1993-96 ) was longer and better , but her government again fell early , owing to charges of mismanagement and corruption .
+in reality , machinations by the intelligence agencies also played a part .
+the military had developed an entrenched distrust of her , given her position as a popularly supported pro - western leader who wanted peace with india .
+after almost a decade in self - imposed exile , bhutoo 's return to pakistan in october gave her a fresh political start .
+pakistan had changed , as military dictatorship and religious extremism in the north played havoc with the fabric of society .
+a tentative arrangement with musharraf , together with western support -- particularly from the united kingdom and the united states -- eased her return , which hundreds of thousands of people welcomed , though terrorists greeted her with a string of suicide bombings .
+bhutto 's contacts with mushararf 's military government drew criticism , but she remained adamant that a return to democracy was possible only through a transition in which musharraf would give up his military post , become a civilian head of state , and conduct free and fair elections .
+to the dismay of some democratic forces , bhutto stayed the course even after musharraf imposed emergency rule on november 3 and removed the country 's top judges to ensure his re - election .
+indeed , she even persuaded other important political leaders to participate in the planned january 8 election , which she viewed as an opportunity to challenge religious extremist forces in the public square .
+she seized that opportunity by bravely traveling throughout the country , despite serious threats to her life , arguing for a democratic and pluralistic pakistan .
+one can understand why religious extremists like al-qaeda and taliban would target her , and the government claims that it is impossible to defend against a suicide attack .
+but bhutto was reportedly killed by a sharp shooter before the terrorist blew himself up .
+so , in the eyes of pakistan 's people , and especially of bhutto 's supporters , the intelligence services , either alone or in collaboration with extremists , finally decided to eliminate her .
+whether or not the government was involved , the fact remains that pakistan has lost a desperately needed leader .
+with pakistan 's future in the balance , the west 's help and support will be crucial , but that means recognizing that musharraf is not the only leader who can resolve pakistan 's myriad problems and manage the war on terror .
+on the contrary , by nurturing the current environment of instability and uncertainty , musharraf himself must be regarded as one of pakistan 's biggest problems .
+exorcising musharraf 's ghost
+cambridge -- following its recent free elections , pakistan is rebounding politically .
+but the euphoria that came with the end of the musharraf era is wearing off , as the new government faces stark choices .
+unlike iraq and afghanistan , democracy is not new to this 60 - year - old state , but ethnic cleavages , weak institutions , and religious extremism in the north are perennially destabilizing .
+and , while the new government settles in and establishes its priorities , the west , especially the united states , must reassess the impact of its past dealings with pakistan .
+pakistan 's new prime minister , yousaf gilani , is a seasoned politician and , more importantly , has sufi family roots , which is a good omen because of the sufi tradition of tolerance .
+gilani unequivocally declared in his inaugural address that fighting terrorism is a top priority , and his first decision was to release from house arrest judges deposed by musharraf .
+the respite from the horrendous spate of suicide bombings since the new government assumed power is similarly heartening .
+but the honeymoon period is coming to an end .
+already , in gilani 's hometown of multan , rioters attacked government offices and banks to protest electricity disruptions .
+a couple of well - known opposition politicians , a chief minister and a federal cabinet minister of the previous pro - musharraf government , were publicly thrashed , raising doubts about government control over law and order in the country .
+so far , musharraf has accepted his diminishing stature quietly -- though he has few other options .
+the new political leadership , both inside and outside the parliament , has been carefully avoiding a head - on collision with the president .
+interestingly , in the midst of the political transition , musharraf embarked on a week - long visit to china to lobby for construction of an oil and gas pipeline between china and the persian gulf that would be routed through pakistan .
+the deeper question raised by this proposal is whether musharraf meant to convey a message to the us that pakistan 's priorities were shifting .
+the revival of democratic politics in pakistan will undoubtedly effect pakistan - us relations .
+pakistan 's military links with america appear to remain on a sound footing , so the strategic alliance with the us is likely to continue , perhaps with some nuanced differences over how to fight the " war on terror . "
+but pakistani politicians are bound to be influenced by domestic public opinion , which is generally critical of us policies .
+nevertheless , long - term us interests in the region will be better served if pakistan 's democratic forces successfully establish themselves .
+a proposal in the us senate to increase development and education aid to pakistan could help in winning the hearts and minds .
+meanwhile , president george w. bush has said that " if another september 11 - style attack is being planned , it probably is being plotted in pakistan and not afghanistan . "
+whether this american intelligence assessment is based on credible information is unknown .
+american election - year politics may also be behind this assertion .
+but it is significant that bush decided to voice this view during pakistan 's political transition .
+pakistan must take this view seriously , regardless of bush 's motivations .
+the new government should quickly devise a policy to deal with terrorism .
+recent months have seen dozens of suicide bombings and other terrorist activities -- the price of pakistan 's own past blunders , as well as those of the west .
+afghanistan is a prime example , as is the failure to settle the kashmir imbroglio with india .
+both failures have strengthened domestic terrorist groups .
+pakistan 's government appears to be preparing to talk to some of the extremists in the tribal areas , introduce political reforms , and redouble development efforts .
+but reference to " talks " makes the west uncomfortable .
+american officials have likened this strategy to negotiating with terrorists , and point to a previous round of negotiations that did nothing to stop violence in the tribal areas .
+but the new leadership wants to distinguish between al-qaeda terrorists and religious conservatives and disillusioned pashtun youth within pakistan .
+after all , the victory of the secular awami national party ( anp ) in pakistan 's north - west frontier province is a strong indication that people there have rejected religious political forces and violence .
+this window of opportunity can be expanded through dialogue and reconciliation with those who are ready to disavow extremism and militancy .
+the new pakistani government needs to explain this to the west in order to keep its support .
+the us , meanwhile , should end direct military strikes in the area , even if these are conducted with the knowledge and cooperation of pakistan 's military .
+force has never worked with the pashtun tribes , and there is no evidence that this has changed .
+there are real signs that the new government is considered a credible partner in the tribal areas .
+it needs to be given time to find a way out of the endless cycle of violence .
+pervez musharraf 's long goodbye
+islamabad -- pervez musharraf of pakistan stands virtually alone today while facing the most serious challenge to his presidency : possible impeachment by the new democratically - elected government .
+the potential charges are serious : conspiring to destabilize the government that was elected last february , unlawfully removing the country 's top judges in november 2007 , and failing to provide adequate security to benazir bhutto before her assassination last december .
+allying himself with the bush administration has increased his unpopularity , especially following missile attacks by the united states in pakistan 's tribal areas .
+despite earlier differences on how to deal with musharraf , pakistan 's leading political parties are now united against him .
+feuding between the pakistan people 's party , led by benazir 's widower , asif ali zardari , and the pakistan muslim league ( n ) , led by former prime minister nawaz sharif , had given musharraf a chance to regain some standing after his allies were defeated in the february elections .
+american reluctance to abandon musharraf -- together with prolonged electricity shortages , which made the new government appear incompetent -- also raised his hopes .
+musharraf may be counting on the army , his primary constituency , to bail him out of this crisis .
+though such support remains a possibility , it is unlikely that the army leadership will extend itself on his behalf .
+though a protégé of musharraf , the army 's chief of staff , general ashfaq kayani , is a professional soldier for whom the army 's institutional interests are more important than the political interests of his former army boss .
+kayani has repeatedly declared that the army will not interfere in political affairs , and that the parliament and constitution are supreme .
+even if the army is tempted to step in on musharraf 's behalf , it has been chastened by political developments during the past year .
+the entire legal community arose to demand restoration of the country 's judges and reinforcement of the rule of law .
+the public 's demand for free elections and the resulting creation of a democratic government have forced the military to accept the public will .
+the army has also paid a heavy price for musharraf 's approach to the war on terror .
+suicide bombers have struck repeatedly at military installations and personnel around the army 's headquarters in rawalpindi .
+an increase in deadly attacks on army convoys in the pakistan - afghanistan tribal areas has also pushed the army away from musharraf .
+though the army has reaped a financial windfall from us military aid , and has targeted many foreign militants allied with al-qaeda in the region , its performance against pakistani militants has been mixed at best .
+consequently , the prestige of the taliban and other militant groups operating in the area has grown .
+in this context , the army , seeking to avoid sole responsibility for reverses , wants a popular government to take charge of policy .
+no such government can emerge if the elected parties are unseated .
+nevertheless , there are signs of disagreement on important matters between the government and the army .
+the military recently blocked a government move to place pakistan 's infamous intelligence service , the isi , under the control of the interior minister rather than the prime minister .
+musharraf backed the military 's opposition to this reform , gaining some gratitude from military commanders .
+during prime minister yousaf raza gilani 's recent visit to the us , president bush repeatedly said that his administration supports pakistan 's democracy , a policy since reiterated by secretary of state condoleezza rice .
+this indicates that the us will not back musharraf in any confrontation between him and pakistan 's democratic forces .
+most pakistanis hope so .
+musharraf must assess what will be his legacy .
+rather than trying to face down impeachment and prolonging the crisis , he should recognize that pakistan cannot afford more instability , and that giving up honorably will bring him some respect .
+for the sake of argument , even if musharraf faces impeachment and by some stroke of luck is saved from being thrown out of office , his future will be bleak .
+in march 2009 , the current ruling coalition will gain more seats in the senate , and the government would almost certainly try to impeach him again .
+moreover , any attempt by musharraf to dislodge the government by using his constitutional authority would trigger another election , the results of which would not be much different from the vote in february .
+it is time for musharraf 's friends in the west to press him to serve his country one last time , by avoiding confrontation with his country 's democratic forces and calling it quits .
+south asia at war
+cambridge -- last month 's terrorist assault in mumbai targeted not only india 's economy and sense of security .
+its broader goal was to smash the india - pakistan détente that has been taking shape since 2004 .
+the attackers did not hide their faces or blow themselves up with suicide jackets .
+anonymity was not their goal .
+they wanted to be identified as defenders of a cause .
+unless this cause is fully understood , and its roots revealed across the region , this attack may prove to be the beginning of the unmaking of south asia .
+regional conflict , involving all of the region 's states and increasing numbers of non - state actors , has produced large numbers of trained fighters , waiting for the call to glory .
+within both india and pakistan , economic disparities and a sense of social injustice have created fertile ground for conflict .
+the use and abuse of religious fervor , whether " jihadi " or " hindu fundamentalist , " are striking at the roots of communal harmony across south asia .
+much of the current trouble can be traced to afghanistan , whose tragedy could never have remained confined within its designated borders .
+the dynamics of the region changed when the afghan freedom fighters of 1980 's were converted into " mujahidin " through a criminal enterprise in which both the west and the muslim world happily participated .
+pakistan , always insecure about india , became the hub of this transformation .
+the west thought it had moved on after the fall of the soviet empire , but the region -- and increasingly the global community -- continues to pay a heavy price for this unholy project .
+the ills of two decades in south asia can be attributed to the afghan jihad years : the rise of the taliban , the dominance of pakistani - sponsored religious fanatics within the kashmir freedom movement , and the eventual spread of sectarian conflict within pakistan . in afghanistan , pakistan 's military and intelligence agencies sought " strategic depth " against india .
+moreover , they wanted payback for india 's role in supporting the revolt in the 1960 's and 1970 's that led to bangladesh 's independence from pakistan .
+india is not blameless here .
+it was pursuing a two - pronged strategy -- making the argument that all was well in kashmir ( a blatant lie ) and supporting ethnic confrontation in pakistan .
+violent intelligence wars between pakistan 's inter - services intelligence ( isi ) and india 's research and analysis wing ( raw ) have become a brutal reality in south asia .
+lashkar - e - taiba ( let , army of the pure ) , a pakistan - based militant outfit supporting insurgency on the indian side of kashmir , was a product of these years .
+according to indian investigators , this group is implicated in the mumbai attacks .
+pakistan 's clampdown on its offices throughout the country essentially confirms this conclusion , though pakistan is publicly demanding more evidence .
+let was the armed wing of an ahle - hadith organization , a south asian version of saudi - style fundamentalism , whose purpose was to hit indian forces in kashmir .
+though the group was banned by former pakistani president pervez musharraf after the terrorist attacks on the united states of september 11 , 2001 , some of its operators went underground and others joined jamaat - ud - dawa ( jud , party of proselytizing ) -- an organization that runs religious educational centers and charities .
+given its established linkages with pakistan 's intelligence outfits , the group was never targeted strongly .
+in fact , it was even involved in rescue operations on the pakistani side of kashmir after the devastating 2005 earthquake there .
+what pakistan 's military strategists failed to realize was that groups like let and jud had local agendas as well -- converting pakistan into a theocracy .
+hafiz saeed , the founder of let and currently the head of jud , once proudly argued that : " we believe in the clash of civilizations , and our jihad will continue until islam becomes the dominant religion . "
+jud , along with many other like - minded groups , radicalized thousands of young pakistanis . through its web and print publications , it also routinely challenged the teachings of the sufi mystics who originally brought islam to south asia by promoting pluralism and love for humanity .
+even while demanding strong action against jud , india must recognize that pakistan is itself a victim of terror .
+any military confrontation with pakistan will only empower pakistani radicals .
+india also needs to look inward , as anti - muslim violence in gujarat and the activities of hindu fundamentalist groups have potentially created recruitment opportunities for muslim extremists within india . an amicable resolution of the kashmir conflict will only help improve peace prospects in south asia .
+for pakistan , a concerted and sustained effort against all extremist groups operating in the country is necessary .
+militants of all stripes must be decommissioned completely and transparently .
+equally important for pakistan is to expand and reform its public education system and improve basic services so that radical groups cannot lure young people into their educational and welfare networks .
+otherwise , the status quo can gravely threaten pakistan 's -- and south asia 's -- future .
+the fight for pakistan 's soul
+cambridge -- as its army confronts , ever more bloodily , the taliban in the swat valley , pakistan is fighting for its very soul .
+the army appears to be winning this time around , in marked contrast to its recent half - hearted confrontations with taliban forces in neighboring tribal areas .
+for now , the taliban are on the run , some with shaved beards and some in burqas , to avoid being recognized and thrashed .
+the reason is simple : increasingly , people across pakistan support the army 's action .
+this support persists despite the terrible humanitarian cost : more than 1.5 million internal refugees .
+this round of fighting was preceded by a negotiated calm , as the government sought to quell militants in pakistan 's tribal areas by striking a deal with the taliban leader , sufi mohammad .
+the deal , which instituted a version of sharia law in the region in exchange for a commitment that militants would lay down their weapons , was blessed by the comparatively liberal awami national party ( anp ) , which governs the north - west frontier province ( nwfp ) , where swat is located .
+but the taliban 's assurances of a lower profile were upended by two incidents that exposed its real face .
+first , private news channels broadcast across the country a video clip recorded on a cell phone of the public flogging of a 17 - year - old swat girl .
+this gave the public a stark sense of what taliban justice really meant .
+then , mohammad was interviewed on geo tv , where he explained his political views .
+according to mohammad , democracy is un - islamic , as are pakistan 's constitution and judiciary , and islam bars women from getting an education or leaving their homes except to perform the hajj in mecca .
+religious conservatives were stunned .
+leaders of the religious parties rushed to denounce mohammad 's views .
+the pakistani media revisited a famous comment by mohammad iqbal , the poet - philosopher who devised the idea of an independent muslim state in pakistan .
+" the religion of the mullah , " he said , " is anarchy in the name of allah . "
+still , it 's not over until it 's over -- and in the short term a lot depends on the state 's capacity to hold the swat area and re - establish civilian institutions there .
+and , even if the state succeeds , re - asserting control over swat will only be the first step .
+the taliban is spread throughout the nwfp and the federally administered tribal areas .
+" punjabi taliban " militants from the fighting in kashmir against india continue to shuttle between the punjab heartland and the northwest territories , posing another serious challenge to government authority .
+in the long - term , however , what really matters is whether the muslims of south asia will be able to roll back the spread of talibanization altogether .
+the answer to that question lies within the various muslim communities of the region , not just in pakistan .
+afghanistan faces an election later this year .
+a clear and transparent vote will make a real difference in establishing the credibility of the afghan government .
+in pakistan , the democratic transition , after years of military rule , is still not complete .
+there is much hope , though , in the vibrancy of the pakistani media , as well as in the energy that the legal community generated last march in restoring deposed chief justice iftikhar mohammad chaudhry to his seat on the supreme court .
+then there is the pakistani army , the country 's " super political party . "
+to a large degree , pakistan 's relations with india , afghanistan , and the united states depend on the military .
+army commander ashfaq kiyani has shown no interest in taking over the state , as his predecessor , general pervez musharraf , did .
+but the army must accept its subservience to pakistan 's political leadership .
+the army command must finally recognize that repeated military interventions have not served the country well .
+most significantly , in the face of martial law and political assassination , pakistanis have not given up their dream of democracy .
+a living example of this is afzal lala , a pashtun politician associated with the awami national party who , despite all the threats from the bloodthirsty tehrik - e - taliban pakistan , remained in swat through the recent fighting .
+democracy will be decisive because it generates investments in education , health , and economic empowerment that reward ordinary voters .
+talibanization gains ground when people lose faith in the capacity of the modern state to improve their lives .
+while poor law enforcement needs urgent attention , counter - terrorism is never solely a military affair .
+financial pledges from the us and the " friends of pakistan " consortium ( the european union , china , and japan ) are important , but when it comes to investing wisely in development projects , pakistan 's track record is nothing to be proud of .
+effective oversight from donors and pakistan 's private sector will be critical .
+only one condition should be imposed on aid for pakistan : the first money should be spent on rebuilding all the bombed - out girls ' schools in swat .
+if need be , the army should guard these schools around the clock .
+pakistan 's next fight
+new york -- the terrorist sanctuary in the south waziristan region of pakistan 's tribal frontier with afghanistan is coming apart .
+it took a while for the pakistani army to move against the region 's rising violence and chaos , but its campaign in south waziristan is making progress .
+the campaign 's immediate impact consists in pakistan 's determination to establish its authority in the area .
+but the window for the military to fill the power vacuum will be open only briefly .
+the terrorists have shown before that they can take a punch , strike back , and even rebuild their networks .
+indeed , even as the pakistani army launched operation rah - e - nijat ( path to salvation ) in october , a dozen devastating terrorist attacks in pakistan 's major cities demonstrated the reach of the south waziristan militants .
+in a few instances , senior army and intelligence officers were targeted outside their homes in islamabad , despite extensive security measures in and around the capital .
+the october 11 attack on army headquarters in rawalpindi was the most daring of all -- and sent shudders across the military command , because the terrorists knew the layout of the military and security buildings .
+but this inside knowledge also worked against the militants , because it demonstrated what was at stake for the country at large .
+but success in south waziristan is only the starting point for dealing with the problem .
+militant hubs are scattered throughout the sparsely - populated tribal areas , including the north waziristan , orakzai , and mohmand regions .
+moreover , violent militancy has now spread into pakistan proper .
+southern punjab is seeing a rapid growth in the number of religious fanatics , and rooting out the problem there is much more challenging than acting in the pashtun tribal areas .
+many militants in punjab worked closely with the pakistani intelligence services for years , and their infrastructure is dispersed and hidden in various towns and villages .
+the army , which recruits heavily in the punjab , will not use force there in the way it is doing in the tribal areas .
+only a concerted law - enforcement effort , with the full support of the intelligence services , can succeed in the pakistani heartland .
+the deep security crisis in pakistan is mirrored across the border in afghanistan , which offers a model of what not to do .
+the afghan taliban , removed from power and routed from the country by the end of 2001 , needed only a few years to revive itself , owing to the failure of the afghan government and its international backers to rebuild and stabilize the country .
+a critical factor in the taliban 's revival was the haven that it found in the distant reaches of the pakistan - afghanistan border , and the support that it continued to receive from elements within pakistan .
+this time , as the afghan taliban are expelled from pakistan , nato and afghan forces must be ready to take them on .
+observing the fighting in pakistan , the united states , afghanistan , and india expect the pakistani army to take on both the afghan taliban and the pakistani militants .
+but thousands of fighters are thought to be dispersed in the pashtun tribal areas of pakistan , with many of them focused on operations in afghanistan .
+the cross - border movement of radicals suggests the importance of international cooperation .
+moreover , alliances among radical groups are constantly shifting , a reflection of tribal traditions and opportunism .
+outsiders watching these shifts , and the pakistani government 's handling of them , have been unable to discern a consistent pattern that would explain pakistani policy .
+but here , regional politics must be taken into account , especially the continuing rivalry between india and pakistan .
+at every stage of the lengthy conflict that has brought the us into the region , pakistan has sought to limit indian influence in afghanistan .
+indeed , india 's growing influence and investment in afghanistan is disturbing to pakistan 's national security apparatus .
+ultimately , the dynamics of afghan politics will determine afghanistan 's fate .
+but a collaborative india - pakistan effort to stabilize the country could work wonders .
+for both pakistan and india , afghanistan risks turning into a new disputed territory , like kashmir , where conflict has damaged both countries for more than 60 years .
+in afghanistan today , they have an opportunity to reject that precedent and act on their mutual interest in stability .
+pakistan must be able to focus internally on its future .
+financially insolvent and politically paralyzed , pakistan needs international help to bring development to its liberated tribal areas and hope to the young people -- 65% of the population -- who live there .
+for india , stability in pakistan and afghanistan would ease its rise to global economic power .
+both countries should take advantage of the opportunity for cooperation provided by the pakistani army 's campaign against waziristan 's militants .
+syria 's culture of fear and stalemate
+it is not surprising that the new , young leader of an arab country should be tremendously concerned , during his first years in office , with establishing his legitimacy and stature .
+in replacing his father , the late president hafiz al-assad , syria 's current president , bashar al-assad , urgently needed to demonstrate his command of his country 's situation even more than other relatively new arab leaders , such as jordan 's king abdullah or morocco 's king muhammad .
+for bashar al-assad selection as the replacement for his father , within minutes of assad 's death on june 10 , 2000 , had stunned syria 's entire system , despite the years of preparing public opinion for this succession .
+having failed to put forward a clear and effective program of internal reform , the young president sought to make up for his domestic failure in the realm of foreign affairs .
+here , no surprise , the ongoing arab - israeli conflict provided the most visible opportunity to establish his leadership credentials , especially in the aftermath of the democratic election of ariel sharon as israel 's new prime minister , a man reviled in the arab world .
+during the recent arab summit in beirut , the young president capitalized on the absence of the egyptian , libyan and palestinian leaders ( among others ) to strike a positive chord with audiences in syria and across the arab world .
+in a well - rehearsed , self - assured manner reminiscent of his late father , bashar al-assad aimed a provocative lecture at his colleagues , supporting the palestinians ' " right of resistance , " calling upon arab countries to sever their relations with israel , urging an iraqi - kuwaiti reconciliation , and endorsing saudi crown prince abdallah 's peace initiative .
+with these demands , the young president emerged in many syrian eyes as the summit 's " man of the hour , " a leader with a deep understanding of the issues at hand .
+through his confident performance , the new president gained in stature .
+more importantly , his performance deflected attention from any consideration of economic or political reform within syria , at least for now .
+initially , president bashar 's accession to power was accompanied by a modest , but noticeable political thaw .
+popular forums and private discussion clubs sprung up across syria , allowing relatively open debate .
+after a few months , these popular forums were brought to an abrupt halt , as security services enforced a stringent set of regulations that effectively closed these open gatherings .
+the shortness of this syrian " spring " came as a hard blow to the expectations of many of the country 's intellectuals and professionals , young and old .
+this blow was felt all the more sharply as it became obvious that curtailment of these popular forums did not stir a wide public reaction .
+forced to recognize the prospect of being marginalized yet again by the new government , syrian intellectuals turned their attention to sharon and the growing conflict between israelis and palestinians .
+once again , the palestinian cause became a substitute for focused attention on syria 's domestic situation , offering syrian intellectuals and professionals a politically safe way to vent their frustrations .
+as for the syrian " street , " that amorphous mixture of average citizens and popular consensus , not only did it lack any sympathy for the intellectuals , it also failed to show any systematic interest in domestic politics .
+the main concerns of the average syrian , it seems , are definite improvements in living standards and a reduction in the high unemployment rate .
+broader concerns about reform - civil law , women 's rights , and the role of religion in society - remain issues that the syrian street prefers to avoid .
+for better or worse , restrictions in these areas are well - understood constants of syrian life .
+challenging them in difficult and insecure times is not an appealing prospect .
+the passivity of syrian society is the result of a tacit agreement between people and government .
+the government does not dabble too much in social affairs , while the people do not involve themselves too much in internal politics .
+meanwhile , the arab - israeli conflict serves as a mutually agreed upon rallying point for syria 's government and governed .
+as the pretext for ignoring the repression of basic freedoms , that conflict has come to be described in powerful national and religious rhetoric throughout syrian society .
+what might otherwise be seen as a political conflict has acquired significant socio - cultural dimensions .
+it is therefore legitimate to wonder whether syria 's president can act with any real initiative toward the arab - israeli conflict .
+despite the dictatorial nature of his regime , president al-assad still needs to satisfy popular sentiment regarding israel .
+to betray this consensus runs the risk of mobilizing people on behalf of other , more domestically - oriented concerns .
+this is the risk of all popular mobilization in the middle east ; syria simply exhibits a more potent version of it .
+is syria next ?
+the recent allegation by us secretary of defense donald rumsfeld that syria is smuggling war materiel into iraq raises the ominous prospect that america 's attention will turn toward damascus the moment it is finished with baghdad .
+rumsfeld 's charge -- vehemently denied by syria -- now tops a long list of unresolved issues in syria 's relations with the us : syria 's open - ended military intervention in lebanon and continued support of hezbollah there ; its supposed involvement in the 1982 suicide attack in beirut that killed 241 us marines ; its continued support of various " outlawed " palestinian groups ; and its allegedly growing stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons .
+indeed , syria has long been included on the us state department 's list of nations that support terrorism .
+for these reasons , syria could well become a potential target for american military adventurism .
+even before the onset of the current hostilities , the possibility was raised by certain members of the bush administration , such as richard perle , and conservative media commentators , all of whom would gladly add syria to the " axis of evil . "
+recognizing this possibility , the syrian regime has made clear its opposition to the american war in iraq , which has been branded by president bashir assad and other senior officials as " a war of aggression " .
+top - level thinking about the risks that syria runs were recently made clear in an interview that president assad gave to a lebanese newspaper .
+assad compared the situations in lebanon and iraq , insisting that iraq could achieve what lebanon had already accomplished two decades before , namely the forced withdrawal by american and british troops in the face of steadfast , bloody resistance . " the us and britain will not be able to control iraq , " assad claimed .
+declaring that " arab popular resistance " to the american invasion has spread through the region , assad referred to the increasing numbers of arab , including syrian , " volunteers " who have gone to iraq to fight alongside saddam 's soldiers .
+the arabs , assad said , would resist american efforts " to rearrange the region as it sees fit " in order to control its oil wealth and accommodate israeli interests .
+in response , he called for the enactment of the arab mutual defense pact .
+recently , the 90 - year - old grand mufti of syria , sheik ahmad kiftaro , called on muslims worldwide to carry out " martyr operations " against american interests , a call that could not have been made without advance government approval .
+it seems that the syrian regime is painting itself into a dark and dreary corner , a development that could set the stage for a potential showdown with the us in the not - so - distant future .
+this said , however , there is also an unpublicized aspect of syrian - american relations to consider .
+since the terrorist attacks on new york and washington on september 11 , 2001 , security cooperation between the two countries seems to have intensified .
+the syrian intelligence apparatus has provided much valuable information on the activities of muhammad atta and others suspected of involvement in those attacks , as well as information about other al-qaeda activities .
+there are even indications of some syrian intelligence - sharing with the americans regarding iraqi military readiness in the weeks preceding the attacks .
+this should not be surprising , for syria 's rulers over the last thirty years have proven skillful at hedging their bets .
+it is even possible that the regime 's loud anti - american stance might be meant to hide some secret arrangement with the americans , especially regarding the kurds and iraqi opposition members living in syria .
+nonetheless , if the americans win in iraq -- which they must in order to maintain their global credibility as a superpower -- their relations with their new syrian neighbors will not be easy .
+resolving all outstanding issues will not happen quickly .
+moreover , the syrian view of the arab - israeli dispute cannot be glossed over , because syrian agreement is necessary for any peaceful settlement .
+if the us attempts to isolate syria , it will not have an easy time of it .
+damascus maintains good political and economic relations with russia , china , and key eu members , especially france , with its paternalistic attitude towards its former colony and its young president .
+on the other hand , with americans controlling iraq , syria will find itself surrounded by three unfriendly ( if not outright hostile ) and allied neighbors : the americans in the east , and the turks and israelis in the north and south , both of which occupy syrian territories .
+nonetheless , outstanding issues between syria and the us would be better resolved using smart diplomacy than smart bombs .
+considering the evidence on display in iraq , syrian leaders must be wondering whether the bush administration is capable of thinking in these terms .
+at the same time , will syria 's new rulers prove capable of striking the kind of machiavellian bargain for which the late syrian president , hafiz al-assad , was famous ?
+because the country 's rulers include many members of his team , such a possibility probably exists .
+but are the americans willing to see it ?
+cradle of contradictions
+the american - led invasion of iraq was supposed to begin a process of transformation across the middle east .
+syrian poet and political analyst ammar abdulhamid suggests that a thaw - if not quite change , then perhaps its precursor - is now occurring in syria .
+life in syria has never been simple .
+the realities , meticulously hidden under a veneer of homogeneity , have always been too complex for even the most discerning of scholars .
+the peaceful coexistence between the country 's myriad ethnic , religious , and tribal groups is the result of a complex layer of concessions , compromises , tacit agreements , and other pragmatic arrangements perfected over the centuries .
+over the last few months , life has become even more complex , as both the country 's ruling elite and civil society advocates seem more bewildered than ever about the country 's future .
+each group is focused on determining its particular privileges while preserving the territorial integrity and national unity of a country growing increasingly fractious and fragile .
+these developments , of course , follow from the us - led invasion of iraq , which turned a vague and distant threat into an imposing neighbor whose intentions towards syria 's baathist regime are anything but friendly .
+consequently , the need for drastic change in the structure and style of a previously reality - impaired regime has finally begun to sink in .
+as a result , syria 's various political power centers have embarked on a desperate search for a vision to promote change yet allow the existing order to survive .
+because syria 's rulers have neither the ability nor the know - how to produce such a vision , civil society has been granted some leeway for action .
+clearly , this expansion of civil society 's operating arena may even turn into open opposition to syria 's rulers .
+the point is to allow for some debate to take place in the hope of producing the sorely needed vision of change .
+this will give the outside world the impression that serious change is taking place and that the regime should be given the time to see it through .
+crackdowns , detentions , and illegal trials thus exist hand in hand with a growing tolerance for creative initiatives .
+over twenty ngos have been formed in the last few months .
+many are charities and often include on their advisory boards one or two members with clear government connections ( the daughter of a minister or an army general , or , in a couple of notable instances , the president 's wife ) .
+even so , this development is still significant by syrian standards , as independent initiatives are traditionally frowned upon .
+the launch of the tharwa project one month ago inadvertently coincided with kurdish riots that rocked northern syria .
+this , together with the prominence of the advisory board ( which includes well - known egyptian sociologist saad eddin ibrahim , french expert on political islam gilles kepel , and flynt leverett , a brookings institution fellow ) and the sensitivity of minority rights in general , combined to give the project national , regional , and international notice .
+so far , syria 's authorities have not reacted to the tharwa project .
+but the project seems to represent the type of activity that can help produce visions for change .
+some in the syrian government could be aware of this .
+nevertheless , fourteen civil society activists who attempted to organize a special meeting to address the realities of the kurdish issue in syria recently received various sentences on charges of working to undermine national unity .
+the authorities clearly wish to control the extent of the thaw in syria 's political culture .
+but even as such crackdowns continue , more private independent initiatives are bubbling to the surface .
+for my colleagues and me , this is the time for hard and continuous work to expand the space of popular participation in the country and region .
+we can deliver no judgment at this stage as to where things might be heading .
+everything and anything seems possible .
+still , it is tempting to think that syria is witnessing a new beginning , and the end of an era whose sins we all bear .
+is dialogue with iran and syria worth it ?
+despite frequent claims to the contrary , the fundamental problem in the middle east is not intervention by the west .
+on the contrary , the real problem is that , for all their dabbling , the western powers seem capable of neither war nor dialogue .
+this leaves everyone in the region at the mercy of the middle east 's oppressive regimes and proliferating terrorists .
+advocates of the iraq war lacked an understanding of the complexities on the ground to wage an effective war of liberation and democratization .
+as a result , their policies merely ended up eliminating iran 's two major regional rivals : the taliban and saddam hussein 's regime .
+this presented iran with a golden opportunity to project itself as a regional hegemon , and iran 's leaders are unlikely to let this opportunity slip away .
+advocates of dialogue with the iranians and their syrian allies , like former united states secretary of state james baker , labor under the delusion that they can actually reach an understanding that can enable a graceful us exit from iraq and help stabilize that wounded country .
+the delusion is based on two false assumptions : that the iranians and the syrians can succeed in iraq where the us has failed , and that the international community can afford to pay the price of ensuring their cooperation .
+true , syria and iran are playing a major role in supporting iraqi insurgents , and syria is still encouraging the trafficking of jihadists and weapons across its borders with iraq .
+but the idea that these activities can be halted at will is naïve .
+for one thing , the interests of the shia communities in iraq and iran are not the same .
+iraqi shia have never accepted iranian dictates , and many took part in saddam 's war against iran in the 1980 's .
+after all , the iraqi shia are arabs , and if they are now willing to coordinate their activities with their persian counterparts , their main goal will always be to secure an independent course as soon as possible , even while they carry on with their internecine disputes within iraq .
+iran is in no better position than the us to convince them to resolve their differences .
+president basher al-assad of syria faces a similar dilemma .
+although he has opened syria 's border to jihadists and has allowed saddam 's supporters to operate freely there , that choice may not be entirely his .
+syria 's aid to saddam in maneuvering around the united nations ' oil - for food program brought iraqi money to inhabitants of the border region , who have always been closer in customs , dialect , and outlook to their iraqi neighbors than to their fellow syrians .
+in the absence of government investment , local inhabitants ' loyalty went to iraqi baathists who helped improve their lot .
+indeed , even local security apparatuses have been unwilling to comply with dictates from assad and his clique to seal the borders .
+in these cirumstances , neither syria nor iran seems capable of delivering anything but mayhem in iraq .
+what , then , would the proposed dialogue between the us and these states achieve other than continue to empower their corrupt yet ambitious regimes ?
+the story gets more complicated when one considers the un inquiry into the assassination of former lebanese prime minister rafiq al - hariri .
+assad wants nothing more than to see this affair forgotten -- and the proponents of dialogue think that they can give him what he wants in the hope of breaking syria 's alliance with iran .
+but that is merely another erroneous ( not to mention amoral ) assumption .
+the alliance between syria and iran dates back more than two decades , and was explicitly reaffirmed by the two ruling regimes as recently as january 2005 .
+indeed , the two regimes are now joined at the hip .
+assad 's recent refusal to attend a summit in tehran with his iranian and iraqi counterparts was a mere tactical move designed to appeal to the proponents of dialogue .
+in fact , iran has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in syria , and annual bilateral trade tops a billion dollars .
+irani 's growing influence over the syrian security apparatus is well established , and iran is funding an effort to create syrian shia militias to compensate for assad 's sagging support in the army and in the minority alawite community .
+assad cannot turn his back on all of this .
+no deal would be sweet enough , even if it included the return of the golan heights .
+for assad and his supporters , survival is more important than sovereignty .
+still , to read the well - known names of commentators and policymakers who are recommending engaging syria and / or iran is a testament to how inconsequential and cut off the western powers have become from the realities on the ground in the world 's most turbulent region .
+that , it seems , is the price of their arrogance .
+gaza 's crushed childhoods
+amman -- ayman is a soft - spoken 14 - year - old boy in jabalia city , gaza .
+his family is poor , and his parents have already sold almost all their furniture to pay for food and schooling for their children .
+recently , after collecting a government food handout , ayman 's father , who has been unemployed since march 2006 , had to sell the milk to pay for the journey back home .
+ayman 's experience is all too familiar in gaza 's crowded , crippled neighborhoods , where those who are least to blame for the troubles are suffering the most .
+ayman , his siblings , and all gaza 's children are finding their lives diminished each day -- a cruel , slow suffocation of their spirit and their dreams .
+instead of enjoying expanding horizons , they are trapped in a virtual prison , where things that every child should be able to take for granted are instead being taken away : the right to play , to go to school , to have enough to eat , to have light to study by at night , and to feel safe in their own homes .
+the weight of one of the world 's longest - running conflicts is resting on their thin shoulders , crushing their childhood and inflicting psychological scars that may never heal .
+palestinians were once reputed to be among the best - educated people in the middle east ; today , after years of violence , isolation , and poverty , their proud tradition of educational excellence has been shattered .
+almost 2,000 children in gaza have dropped out of school in the last five months .
+those who remain must share tattered textbooks and do without crucial resources .
+the january 2008 semester exams at schools in gaza operated by the united nations relief and works agency for palestine refugees in the near east ( unrwa ) found 50-60% failure rates in mathematics and a 40% failure rate in arabic -- the children 's native language . despite this , ayman insists , " i want to be an educated person . i want to be an engineer to build my country . "
+almost half the labor force is unemployed ; local industry has collapsed .
+and unicef - supported counseling teams are spread across the area , helping palestinian parents and children cope with the burden of stress .
+but , while unicef is doing all it can to comfort those in the midst of gaza 's madness , only political leaders can bring the dreadful nightmare to an end . it is time for new engagement . the siege must be lifted .
+the killing of civilians has to stop , on both sides .
+palestinian and israeli children deserve to grow up in peace . and leaders on both sides , supported by the international community , must join in the kind of honest dialogue that is the only viable path toward achieving it .
+ayman 's father quietly says , " my children are my hope . " the children of gaza are a light in the darkness . they deserve a chance to shine .
+europe 's second chance in the balkans
+confronting the disintegration of yugoslavia in 1991 , former eu council president jacques poos made his famous but now derided statement : " this is the hour of europe… not the hour of the americans . "
+what the eu learned from the subsequent four years of balkan disasters under its management is now being tested by another major turning point and potential crisis -- when and how kosovo is to become independent .
+once again , europe 's role may well prove decisive .
+the decision on kosovo may not imply the prospect of renewed large - scale conflict , but it does raise serious questions for europe 's relations with russia and the united states , as well as for stability throughout the balkans .
+while the us has a major stake in the outcome , eu countries obviously have the most significant interests in the region , and perhaps this time they will assume a corresponding leadership role .
+for at least the next two months , the united nations security council will debate a blueprint for kosovo 's future , arduously worked out during a year of " negotiations " between the governments in belgrade and pristina by un envoy and former finnish president martti ahtisaari .
+the bluebrint provides for kosovo 's " supervised independence , " maximum protection for serb and other minorities , and a supervisory role for the eu .
+ahtisaari 's proposal is an acknowledgement that no agreement between the parties is possible , and that there is no constructive alternative to kosovo 's independence .
+together with the us , the eu collectively has rallied around the ahtisaari proposal .
+but individually , a number of european countries -- spain , greece , italy , cyprus , romania , slovakia , and austria -- are skeptical or negative toward kosovo independence , which raises profound questions about the eu 's resolve .
+meanwhile , serbian prime minister vojislav kostunica is waging a tireless and remarkably effective diplomatic campaign denouncing both ahtisaari and his proposal .
+he has strengthened the position of many in europe and elsewhere who are skeptical of challenging a country 's territorial integrity or who still claim to believe in a negotiated settlement .
+more worrisome is the current uncertainty about whether a shaky europe will stand up to russia , upon which serbia depends to maintain sovereignty over kosovo .
+so far , the kremlin has resolutely stated that it will accept only a settlement agreed to by both parties , in effect endorsing serbia 's position .
+while conveying the possibility of a veto , russia 's current strategy is to delay a security council vote as long as possible by prompting a new fact - finding mission to kosovo , which will most likely be followed by renewed insistence on another effort to negotiate a settlement .
+serbia welcomes delay in the hope that this will stimulate violence by frustrated kosovars , thereby increasing europe 's opposition to independence and bolstering serbia 's dedication to maintaining the status quo , or , as a last resort , to partitioning kosovo .
+some european countries apparently believe that they can maintain an eu consensus in support of ahtisaari 's plan but allow russian foot - dragging on the grounds that delay is not unreasonable and something better may turn up with additional negotiations .
+but , by adopting such a stance , they thwart their own envoy and may well stimulate the violence they profess to abhor .
+history offers little consolation .
+the eu 's handling of relations with serbia in the past only encouraged intransigence .
+instead of repeatedly making clear that kosovo independence is an indispensable requirement for eu membership -- so important to serbia 's modernization and balkan stability -- eu leaders like javier solana laud kostunica as a great democratic leader .
+they relentlessly but unsuccessfully pressured montenegro 's leaders to remain in a dysfunctional union with serbia , condoned kostunica 's dubious 2006 referendum on a new constitution enshrining kosovo as a part of serbia , and weakened demands for serbia 's cooperation with the international criminal tribunal in the hague .
+realizing ahtisaari 's proposal will depend on eu solidarity and persistence , coupled with strong american support , to manage the vicissitudes of un debate , lobby skeptical non - permanent security council members , such as indonesia and south africa , and persuade russia to abstain rather than exercise its veto .
+many believe that russia will not risk its relations with europe and the us , ultimately abstaining if western countries hold firm .
+but russia appears to be in a gaullist mood , and has other outstanding issues causing friction with the us and europe .
+putin 's russia is not yeltsin 's russia , when the west could simply shunt aside russian concerns .
+europe is vulnerable on many fronts , particularly in view of its dependence on russian energy , while america 's weakened presidency has diminished us influence in russia .
+if russia does veto the ahtisaari plan , the eu 's united facade will likely fracture , with many european countries refusing either to join the us in recognizing an independent kosovo without the un 's blessing or to send a supervisory mission there .
+that would open a new and tumultuous era in the balkans , with more than kosovo at stake .
+indeed , with the un and the western alliance in disarray , the region could fall victim to further russian policy mischief .
+putin 's balkan mischief
+russia is again on a tear .
+this time , the kremlin has stuck its finger in the west 's eye over the long and painful effort to bring kosovo to formal independence .
+unlike the fracas over an american missile shield in europe , this conflict shows no signs of blowing over , and threatens to damage further the rocky relationship between russia and the west .
+at every turn , russia has challenged western efforts to facilitate kosovo 's independence . after a year of negotiations between serbia and kosovo , president vladimir putin 's kremlin rejected the un mediator 's report recommending supervised independence , prevented the security council from accepting that report , and insisted on three additional months of negotiations between serbia and kosovo -- even after compromise became impossible .
+three weeks ago in the un security council , russia again insisted that any agreement required the approval of both serbia and kosovo , and that further negotiations were necessary .
+russia knows that such negotiations will be fruitless , but believes that another seemingly innocent appeal for more talks would strain eu unity , which appears to be a vital goal for putin .
+further delay might also generate violence in kosovo and undermine international support for independence .
+putin 's hatred of the yeltsin era 's " subservient " relations with the west fuels his opposition .
+but the west 's delay in resolving kosovo 's status permitted that opposition to gain traction .
+indeed , the west has consistently misread russia 's intentions on kosovo .
+many claimed that the kremlin was delaying the inevitable but ultimately would not block independence .
+now , at the eleventh hour , russia is sticking to its obstructionist position , and its presidential election in march will likely reinforce anti - western postures .
+so what will putin do when the united states and most european union members recognize an independent kosovo in the coming months without a un blessing , as they now plan ?
+it is unlikely that the kremlin would attempt another military intervention in kosovo ( their effort in 1999 to land troops at pristina airport was a fiasco ) , but it has a range of options that must give the west pause .
+russia has said that it will not give serbia a blank check , but it will likely support the serbian government 's efforts to isolate and destabilize an independent kosovo .
+while serbia has resisted partition of kosovo , russia would also support a serbian proposal to partition the serb - populated north , an effort that would open up a pandora 's box of possible partition of serbia , bosnia , and macedonia .
+such a proposal could get some support in europe and elsewhere as a seemingly appropriate compromise , even if it would destabilize the balkans once more .
+russia will certainly continue its diplomatic efforts to persuade the world that negotiations are the only way to solve the problem , and that it cannot be solved outside the un .
+that will attract support among many un members , including those that have major dissatisfied ethnic minorities .
+russia could also react beyond the balkans , most obviously in the caucasus , with its breakaway regions , particularly in georgia .
+a declaration of independence by kosovo will likely bring a similar declaration from georgia 's breakaway abkhazia region , which russia could well recognize .
+if georgia takes military steps to prevent that , russia 's military would likely react with force , creating a situation that could get out of control .
+while the us and the eu do not want to worsen relations with russia , they cannot retreat in the face of russian obduracy ; security in europe is at stake .
+but they must also continue to try to preempt confrontation with russia on all fronts .
+the west should make clear to serbia that it will react vigorously against any efforts to promote violence or partition kosovo .
+dispatching additional nato troops , in addition to the planned eu mission , to supervise kosovo independence would be helpful .
+putin 's russia , which pays little attention to the rule of law , cloaks its diplomatic effort in the guise of adherence to international law , in particular un security council resolution 1244 , which ended the 1999 kosovo war .
+a long overdue diplomatic offensive needs to be launched to undercut russian arguments as well as remind the world of what happened in kosovo .
+resolution 1244 does not state that kosovo must remain under serb sovereignty , as russia and serbia insist , nor does it preclude independence .
+indeed , any reasonable reading of the resolution -- especially in the context of the conflict - ridden balkans over the past two decades -- would acknowledge that independence would satisfy the resolution 's intent and the purpose of sustaining un supervision of the province for the past eight years .
+in the case of abkhazia , the west should reiterate the sui generis nature of kosovo and highlight the tremendous efforts it has undertaken there since 1999 .
+the world must make clear that russian military involvement in abkhazia is unacceptable , while also restraining georgia 's government from reacting militarily to any provocation .
+how russia reacts to western support of kosovo 's coming declaration of independence will test how far we have progressed since the cold war .
+through careful management of kosovo 's independence process , and attentiveness to opportunities to improve relations with russia , the west might mitigate the worst consequences of this confrontation .
+regardless , a new cold war might just get a little colder .
+recently , the united states achieved the dubious honor of boasting the largest prison and jail population on earth .
+it reached this zenith by surpassing cash - strapped russia - long its only rival as a mass imprisonment society - after russia released thousands of inmates so as to save money .
+a few years earlier , as america rushed to lock up ever more of its population for ever - pettier offenses , the absolute size of its incarcerated population surpassed that of china - despite china 's population being more than four times that of america .
+according to research conducted by the british home office , america now incarcerates over one fifth of the world 's total prisoners .
+there is something bitterly ironic in this . for america really is a land of liberty , a place where lives , often scarred by injustice elsewhere , can be remade .
+how doubly tragic that this has occurred in tandem with a political assault on the great society anti - poverty programs put in place during the 1960s ; that the investments in infrastructure , public education , public healthcare and job training which might curtail crime more effectively are , instead , being replaced by massive public expenditures on building new prisons to incarcerate hundreds of thousands of low - level offenders .
+with such vicious cycles of crime , punishment and dis - investment in poor communities it is no surprise that the prison population has expanded to such an extent .
+the numbers buttressing this sprawling prison system are extraordinary .
+approximately two million americans are now serving either prison or jail time , over one million of them for non - violent offenses ( a preponderance of these either for drug use or low - level drug sales ) .
+per hundred thousand residents , the us has an incarceration rate over five times that of england , six times that of canada , and seven times that of germany .
+somewhere in the region of 10% of african american men in their twenties live behind bars .
+in some states , where a single felony conviction is enough to bar the offender from ever being able to vote again , over one quarter of african american males are disenfranchised .
+high levels of disenfranchisement in florida likely played a critical role in the much - disputed electoral victory of president bush .
+since 1980 , a virtual ` ` prison industrial complex ' ' has arisen , with phenomenal rates of new - prison construction abetted by lucrative construction and prison - guard union lobbies .
+several states , including california , now spend more on prisons than they do on higher education .
+despite dramatically falling crime rates over the last ten years ( which most criminologists attribute more to demography - there have simply been fewer young men of late - than incarceration ) , prison populations have continued to soar .
+much of that increase has more to do with public perceptions about supposed crime waves and ham - handed public and political responses to occasional headline - capturing murders , than any actual underlying crime rate .
+as the actual number of truly heinous crimes has in fact fallen , increasingly it is small - time hoodlums , drug users , and mentally ill people who have been drawing long spells behind bars .
+america today has five times as many prisoners as it did in 1980 .
+one of the most dismaying developments is the spread of so - called ` ` three - strikes - and - you 're out ' ' laws .
+california 's version , passed by citizen referendum in 1993 and ratcheted into place by state legislators in 1994 , provides for the life imprisonment of any criminal with two previous serious convictions who is found guilty of any third felony .
+by the end of last year there were about 7,000 people serving life sentences in california under this law .
+many thousands of them are serving life for small - time ` ` third strikes ' ' : minor drug crimes , car theft , petty fraud , burglary , and drunk driving ( even graffiti spraying , to the tune of $ 400 damage , which has now been reclassified as a felony ) .
+one such man is fifty - eight year old heroin addict billy ochoa , who is serving a staggering 326 years in a supermax ( super maximum security ) prison for $ 2,100 of welfare fraud .
+because he had been convicted of several burglaries over the previous decades , when ochoa was caught making fraudulent applications for food stamps and emergency housing vouchers in los angeles , he was tried under the three strikes law and given sentences on thirteen separate counts to be served in one of the toughest , most secure prisons in america .
+ochoa 's sentence , apart from its extravagant cruelty , may ultimately cost taxpayers as much as a million dollars .
+in many high security american prisons , inmates are routinely kept in virtual isolation , fed in their cells , allowed out for only half an hour of exercise a day , sometimes denied a tv , a radio , or even decorations for their concrete walls - conditions which have been documented to drive many of them into states of serious psychosis .
+how can things have come to this america ?
+now is the time - with the world watching america fight to defend its values - for the worst excesses of its criminal justice system to be addressed .
+it is a tragedy that a great democracy should have so ugly and vast a prison system corroding both its reputation and its polity .
+palestine 's war of generations
+yasir arafat may be dead , but his machiavellian strategies linger .
+ever protective of his position as sole leader of the palestinian people , arafat sought to block any means by which a potential rival could challenge him .
+but in protecting his position , arafat also blocked the appointment of a successor in his lifetime .
+in the first weeks after arafat 's death , that seemed not to matter .
+mahmoud abbas , arafat 's longtime deputy and the architect of the oslo accords , quickly secured the backing of fatah , the plo 's core body .
+a seamless transition appeared possible .
+but now marwan barghouti , fatah 's leader in the west bank during the current intifada , has decided to contest abbas for the presidency of the palestinian authority ( pa ) from his israeli jail cell .
+facing economic stagnation and what palestinian authority prime minister ahmed qurei calls " the anarchy of weapons , " a succession struggle is the last thing palestinians need .
+any new leader must spur the economy , enforce the rule of law , fight corruption , unify the pa 's security agencies , and preserve public safety -- and he must do so quickly or lose authority .
+abbas ( also known as abu mazen ) represents the old guard of palestinian politics .
+but the young guard -- those who led the first intifada ( 1987-1993 ) , as well as those making their names in the current intifada -- want a share of power .
+abbas will thus need to find support within this rising generation of nationalist leaders if he is to succeed .
+resolving this generational struggle peacefully will require democratic elections within fatah for membership of both the revolutionary council and the central committee .
+the sixth fatah congress , the first in sixteen years , will take place in august 2005 and will seek to reconcile the conflict between the old and young guard .
+unlike arafat and his fellow exiles , barghouti , the most prominent leader among the young guard , grew up under israeli occupation , and was arrested and detained several times .
+barghouti 's popularity also stems from his refusal from the beginning to take any office in arafat 's corrupt pa and its institutions .
+although he was elected to the palestinian legislative council in 1996 , barghouti 's reputation soared when the current intifada began in september 2000 .
+his support for attacks against israeli soldiers and settlers in the occupied territories , which he argues is legitimate under international law , has earned him immense popularity among palestinians , but also a sentence of five life terms plus 40 years in an israeli prison .
+whether he can be released from prison is now a source of intense speculation .
+but barghouti has begun speaking out from his jail cell on the political situation , and his presence is growing .
+his decision to challenge abbas means that the " secular " forces within the palestinian movement may be divided at a time when rivals with a robust islamic agenda -- principally hamas and islamic jihad -- are challenging them .
+both hamas and islamic jihad are highly disciplined organizations , exercising tight control over their political and military wings .
+although hamas has been weakened by israel 's targeted assassinations of sheik ahmad yassin and abdel - aziz rantisi , it retains strong military capabilities and popular support ranging between 25-30% , making it the second leading faction in the west bank and gaza .
+hamas has declared that it will not nominate its own candidate for the pa presidency .
+hassan yusuf , a hamas leader who was recently released from an israeli jail after 28 months of administrative internment , explained to al-jazeera that " if hamas assumed the leadership at this time , it would be vilified and isolated by the international community , and then the people would suffer . "
+although hamas is boycotting the election , many hamas sympathizers will vote for the candidate most committed to defending the palestinians ' core demands .
+here hamas members are simply reiterating arafat 's views , which will continue to limit the concessions any new leader can make .
+arafat set forth a blueprint including an independent palestinian state in the west bank and gaza , with east jerusalem as its capital , and a fair and just solution to the refugee problem .
+changing leaders will in no way alter these conditions for making peace .
+so the question is this : who will palestinians , in particular the hamas constituency , think is better able to secure these goals , abbas or barghouti ?
+that answer will most likely determine who will be the pa 's next leader .
+but in the end , israel will also have to make a choice , because peace will require israeli concessions , not just compromises from the palestinians .
+israel must freeze its settlement activity in the west bank and stop constructing its barrier wall on palestinian territories .
+israel must also free palestinian prisoners , remove all checkpoints between palestinian villages and town , and redeploy its forces to positions held prior to september 28 , 2000 , in accordance with phase i of the road map .
+either abbas or barghouti would certainly meet such a demonstration of good faith with good faith of his own .
+the hamas earthquake
+hamas 's crushing defeat of fatah in this week 's elections brings the palestinian people to a crossroads .
+an islamist political party that previously abstained from national politics and rejects fatah 's policy of negotiations with israel , is now in charge in palestine .
+hamas won 76 of 132 seats in the palestinian legislative council , and can count on support from four independent deputies .
+overall , that 's 60% of the seats in parliament , won in nearly every district in the west bank and gaza .
+hamas entered electoral politics only recently , but its massive victory was preceded by wide success in municipal elections .
+hamas 's political moment has come .
+under palestinian law , mahmoud abbas , the palestinian president , must now ask hamas to form a new government .
+for their part , fatah officials seem unwilling to join a hamas - led government .
+although hamas has said that it would seek such a coalition , fatah 's humiliating defeat has left it with little credibility as a governing partner .
+so far , fatah 's senior leaders have declared that they will be a loyal opposition in parliament , leaving governmental responsibility to hamas .
+instead , they will have to focus on rebuilding and reenergizing fatah .
+hamas is well aware of the shock that its victory has produced .
+if fatah refuses to join a coalition , hamas may opt for a government of independents and technocrats .
+it is unlikely that hamas will form a government composed of hardliners .
+the political , security , and economic circumstances of the palestinians require a government focused on solving problems , not ideological purity .
+the most urgent challenge facing the new government is rampant lawlessness and anarchy throughout palestinian society .
+murder , kidnapping , and extortion have reached record heights .
+armed individuals resort to kidnapping to get jobs , free family members from prison , and exact revenge .
+often , the people involved in these crimes belong to local gangs or even to the militias of large clans .
+in opposition , hamas adamantly refused to collect illegal weapons .
+now , it will have to deal with a palestinian society that is armed to the teeth , with poverty rates reaching 70% and unemployment at 35% .
+having benefited from overwhelming political rejection of fatah , hamas will now be judged by how it uses its new authority .
+for the first time , a political clock is ticking for hamas .
+senior hamas officials are well aware of the challenge , and have promised a complete overhaul of palestinian public services and administration .
+more than anything else , hamas 's success in the coming months will be measured by its response to these issues .
+will hamas be able to root out corruption and incompetence , and deliver services fairly and efficiently ?
+how will its election affect palestine 's foreign aid inflows , which form major component of the national budget ?
+initial international reaction to the hamas victory has been severe .
+the bush administration has declared that it will not deal with a hamas government , because hamas remains committed to israel 's destruction .
+this , indeed , is the language of hamas 's 1988 covenant .
+interestingly , however , hamas 's election platform combined different approaches to the issue of a palestinian state .
+on the other hand , the platform repeats hamas 's refusal to relinquish even an inch of historic palestine .
+whether hamas can actually be transformed into a more moderate organization is impossible to say right now .
+but it is clear that hamas is now vulnerable to public opinion and , as a governing authority , will have to deal with the international response to its victory .
+immediately after the election , a senior hamas official , mahmoud al-zahar , said that hamas would maintain the cease - fire with israel begun last february , if israel did the same .
+hamas may be signaling that it will not provoke israel .
+perhaps its governing responsibilities will push hamas toward ongoing discussions with the united states and the international community .
+in any case , despite the election results , and even without fatah in government , abbas remains in charge of negotiations with israel .
+he has quickly called for a revival of peace talks , although israel , like the us , has refused to deal with hamas .
+palestinians have entered uncharted waters .
+they turned out in droves to vote in an election that former us president jimmy carter described as honest , fair and unmarked by violence .
+they elected a party which called for " reform and change " in response to a decade of violence and lawlessness .
+victory achieved , hamas will take on the responsibility for the palestinian side in the israeli - palestinian conflict .
+with the palestinians ' future at stake -- not to mention the future of israel and the middle east -- no one can say if hamas is up to the task .
+hamas and fatah at the crossroads
+the power struggle between the islamist hamas and palestinian president mahmoud abbas and his secular / nationalist fatah movement is intensifying , with tensions breaking into outright combat .
+since hamas was founded in the early 1980 's , it has refused to come under the leadership of the palestine liberation organization ( plo ) .
+hamas 's victory in the parliamentary election earlier this year -- a democratic watershed -- demonstrated that it had come of age politically .
+for the first time in palestinian history , a religious party is dominant .
+but fatah has not accepted defeat , while hamas is convinced that elements within fatah agree with israeli and american plans to topple the hamas government .
+abbas remains the palestinian president , and the basic law makes him commander of all palestinian security forces .
+however , while most official security forces remain loyal to him , over the past year hamas has created an alternative security structure , built around a 4000 - member " operational force . "
+moreover , hamas has announced plans to recruit 1,500 additional security personnel for the west bank , fatah 's stronghold .
+in recent weeks , the two sides have clashed frequently across the gaza strip , heightening tensions further .
+the confrontations have come at a time when abbas has been trying to persuade hamas to moderate its anti - israel stance and ally with fatah in a national unity government .
+abbas believes that hamas 's acceptance of negotiations with israel is the only way to break the international sanctions that are devastating palestinian society .
+intelligence reports suggest that hamas is smuggling weapons and explosives from the sinai into the gaza strip at an accelerated pace .
+the united states , israel , and some arab governments plan to arm and train forces loyal to abbas , especially his presidential guard .
+they want to prepare abbas 's forces in gaza for a confrontation with hamas , which they believe is inevitable .
+israel is considering abbas 's request to transfer arms and ammunitions from egypt and jordan in hopes of bolstering his loyalist forces .
+there is also an american proposal to allow the badr brigade -- a wing of the palestine liberation army that is currently stationed in jordan -- to relocate to the palestinian territories as abbas 's rapid reaction force in gaza in anticipation of a feared civil war .
+the badr brigade is composed of several thousand palestinians , mostly long - time plo activists .
+as the maneuvering continues , israel and egypt find themselves working together to bolster abbas and fatah .
+with the gaza strip in its backyard , egypt has already mediated several times between hamas and fatah , and has been trying , so far unsuccessfully , to arrange a swap of prisoners with israel following hamas 's abduction of israeli soldier gilad shalit .
+but egypt 's government is angry with hamas for opposing the formation of a coalition government .
+indeed , the seizure of shalit deepened the rift between hamas and fatah , which believes that the abduction was staged in order to sabotage discussions about a national unity government .
+more generally , egypt is concerned that gaza is becoming politically radicalized and may be transformed into " hamastan . "
+this , egypt fears , would give a boost to its own islamic radicals , against which the government has long fought .
+egypt also worries about a possible hamas - fatah civil war .
+although hamas has ruled this out , it has shown no hesitation to use heavy force against its opponents .
+likewise , foreign minister mahmoud al-zahar of the hamas - led government says that any dissolution of the government or call for early elections by abbas would be a recipe for civil war .
+fear of major fighting has already sent many palestinians into egypt , leading to the deployment of egyptian troops on the border to control any mass exodus .
+israel , meanwhile , is worried that hamas has strengthened its military grip on gaza , in terms of both fortifications and networks capable of launching qassam rockets into neighboring israeli towns .
+israel might not wait for abbas and his forces , but rather launch a full - scale intervention to weaken hamas .
+can hamas and fatah put aside their differences and form a unity government ?
+abbas says that if a coalition government is not agreed upon within the next two weeks , he will dissolve the current government , a move hamas will not tolerate .
+but forming a coalition government is unlikely to ease the tension between hamas and fatah .
+new confrontations would likely emerge as soon as a new government was formed .
+ironically , the most likely way to avoid large - scale confrontation between fatah and hamas is through an israeli incursion into gaza .
+facing the israelis together is the only way that the rival palestinian groups will postpone their own bloody showdown .
+palestine 's house divided
+president george w. bush 's call for a new peace conference for israel , palestine , and neighboring states that back a two - state solution is a welcome , if very tardy , development .
+but efforts to re - start the peace process now confront a stark new reality : two mutually hostile palestinian entities in hamas - ruled gaza and the fatah - led west bank must now be factored into the process .
+the hamas / fatah face - off marks a dramatic shift in palestinian politics , whose top priorities until now has been an end to the israeli occupation and the establishment of an independent state .
+it also tremendously complicates peace negotiations , which both the palestinians and the " quartet " ( the united states , the european union , the united nations , and russia ) had premised on maintaining the gaza strip and the west bank as a single territorial unit .
+ironically , these territories were reunited by israel 's victory in the 1967 war , after 19 years of separation .
+previously , egypt had ruled in gaza , while jordan annexed the west bank .
+under israel 's occupation , and then with the establishment of the palestinian authority ( pa ) in 1994 , the territories remained separated geographically , but not politically .
+the hamas takeover in gaza has -- at least for now -- ended that political unification .
+palestinian president mahmoud abbas has now set his conditions for dialogue .
+hamas must withdraw its armed men from all security headquarters they occupied , return power to the legitimate authority , and apologize to the palestinian people .
+although internal division harms palestinians ' national interest , it is unlikely amid mutual accusations and incitements that dialogue between fatah and hamas will be conducted soon .
+but the fear that is most consuming abbas and fatah is that the conflict with hamas might spread to the west bank .
+to avoid such a scenario , abbas has banned all militias and military groups in the west bank , including his fatah party 's al-aqsa martyrs brigades .
+abbas has succeeded in convincing israel to grant amnesty to many fatah fugitives in the west bank who will join his security apparatuses .
+abbas has also asked israel to allow the plo 's badr brigade , currently stationed in jordan , to enter the west bank .
+that would give abbas an additional 3,000 well - equipped and trained troops .
+following king abdullah ii of jordan 's intervention , israel appears to have agreed to allow the badr brigade 's entry with full arms and ammunition .
+if fatah is to become a viable partner for peace and regain its grassroots support , it must reform itself and end the widespread corruption that has undermined its reputation .
+abbas must also share power with more disciplined , younger leaders .
+israel can help abbas by releasing senior fatah leader marwan barghouti , who is currently serving five life sentences in an israeli prison .
+owing to his influence with the fatah militias , barghouti 's release could help abbas and the discredited fatah leadership , and boost the younger generation of fatah leaders .
+israel is divided on how to deal with hamas , which will also complicate the start of peace talks .
+some israelis argue that hamas should be encouraged to establish order in gaza and provide assurances to its neighbors .
+if hamas can establish order inside gaza , prevent violence against israel , and stop missile attacks against israeli towns and villages , it might avoid israeli military intervention .
+but the dominant view in israel is that hamas is a direct threat , unwilling to stop attacks on israel .
+for israel , last summer 's fight with hezbollah in lebanon demonstrated the risks of allowing radical islamists to consolidate their power on israel 's border .
+sooner or later , israel is likely to deal with hamas militarily , perhaps even by re - occupying gaza .
+one reason neighboring countries may take part in peace talks is that egypt and jordan fear that hamas could begin actively to support these countries ' own islamic opposition groups .
+moreover , egypt , jordan , and saudi arabia -- the three main sunni muslim regimes -- are concerned that gaza could provide a base for their regional non - arab foe , shiite iran .
+their fear is based on iranian support for islamist groups -- sunni and shiite -- in iraq , lebanon , and palestine , as well as its ongoing relationship with syria .
+if the hamas - fatah split brings about another territorial partition , palestinians ' national aspirations will suffer their gravest setback in the last half - century .
+although the overwhelming majority of palestinians reject the use of force to settle this power struggle , many welcome the change in gaza , where hamas has cleared the streets of armed militias and restored some law and order .
+the palestinians confront a harsh reality .
+whatever actions are taken to confront hamas will undermine the palestinian national project .
+and a palestine divided against itself will never secure its independence .
+hamas takes on the radicals
+gaza city -- the recent shoot - out in a gaza mosque between hamas security officers and militants from the radical jihadi group the warriors of god brought to the surface the deep tensions that divide palestinian islamists .
+twenty - two people died , including the warriors of god 's leader , abdel latif moussa .
+but palestinian security officials doubt that these will be the last casualties .
+with hamas in control for more than two years , the gaza strip has long been considered much more traditional and conservative than the west bank .
+nevertheless , in gaza 's political milieu , hamas is a moderate islamic group that opposes al - qaeda - style extremism . but such extremist islamic groups have been gaining support in gaza , and hamas has noticed .
+the shoot - out in the mosque shows that hamas will be ruthless in taking them on .
+various salafi extremist groups have been operating in gaza for years .
+salafis , whose name is derived from the arabic phrase for " righteous ancestors , " known as " salaf al-salih , " insist on a return to what they consider the purity of the practices of the first muslims .
+hamas has , in the past , cooperated with some of the salafis , assuming they would stand behind hamas 's leadership .
+the army of islam joined in the raid that abducted the israeli soldier gilad shalit in june 2006 .
+the group also took responsibility for the 2007 kidnapping of the bbc 's gaza correspondent alan johnston , who was later released after negotiations led by hamas .
+the warriors of god is one of a handful of radical , al - qaeda - inspired groups to have appeared in the gaza strip in recent months , first coming to public attention in june after claiming responsibility for a failed horseback attack on israel from gaza .
+their web site shares images , language , and music with al-qaeda and other jihadi groups .
+in a recent declaration , the group made favorable mention of al-qaeda leaders osama bin laden and ayman al - zawahiri .
+the warriors of god demands a pure form of islamic practice throughout the gaza strip , including the implementation of sharia religious law and a rejection of democracy .
+indeed , the confrontation at the mosque followed the declaration of an islamic caliphate in gaza , a flagrant rejection of hamas 's authority .
+many young men in gaza have become increasingly radicalized .
+pakistani - style dress has become common , as is the long hair that is thought to resemble the style of the prophet mohammad .
+there are substantial ideological differences between gaza 's salafi al-qaeda affiliates and hamas .
+as a ruling party , hamas has insisted that its sole concern is the palestinian people , not a global islamic revolution .
+hamas has not imposed islamic law in the gaza strip .
+the salafi groups , however , appear increasingly influenced by the growth of radical al - qaeda - style extremism in pakistan , iraq , and afghanistan .
+while traditional salafi movements have stayed away from politics , the younger groups see activism and violence as the best means of realizing their goals .
+but hamas 's failure to establish and implement islamic law is not the only issue that rankles .
+with the border closed under israeli blockade for more than two years , levels of poverty , unemployment , and despair have grown , with young men increasingly interested in joining the global jihad as it comes to gaza .
+indeed , hamas ' confrontation with salafi groups comes as israel is charging that dozens of foreign terrorists have crossed into gaza from the sinai desert to join the violent underground .
+hamas 's crackdown thus highlights its desire to maintain control over its conflict with israel .
+the threat of salafi extremism in gaza is far from over .
+a new salafi group called the brigade of swords of righteousness has declared its obedience to the warriors of god , and has warned gazans to stay away from government buildings , security headquarters , mosques attended by hamas leaders , and other official buildings . the group now considers these legitimate targets .
+with hundreds of tunnels connecting the gaza strip and sinai , it is very difficult to control the flow of arms , ammunition , and possibly foreign fighters .
+hamas 's battle with these radicals , who detonated suicide bombs and killed six hamas security men during the mosque fight , is just beginning .
+residents are afraid that gaza could become another iraq , with bombings and mass killings a daily occurrence .
+hamas will use all means necessary to protect its power , and to break the jihadi groups now spreading in gaza .
+hamas , fatah , and the palestinian dilemma
+gaza city -- with dueling authorities running gaza and the west bank , the palestinian people find themselves in the middle of an experiment .
+in gaza , where hamas is in charge , the high price of armed resistance to israel has discredited any attempts to revive the conflict .
+in the west bank , under fatah rule , negotiations have gone nowhere .
+as a result , palestinians face their most difficult challenge since 1948 .
+israeli threats of renewing its war on hamas in the gaza strip are taken very seriously .
+the scenes of devastation are still vivid in the streets and neighborhoods of gaza , and hamas is taking no chances of provoking israel into a new war .
+the fighting cost hamas two of its top leaders , saeed siyam and nizar rayan , and significantly weakened its military capabilities .
+only recently have these been rebuilt .
+hamas finds itself in a difficult position , since its policy calls for strong resistance , alongside politics .
+yet this policy has failed .
+hamas has put pressure on all resistance groups in gaza to refrain from provoking israel .
+in an unprecedented statement , mahmoud al-zahar , a top hamas leader , said any missiles fired at israel from gaza would be " betrayal missiles . "
+instead , hamas has turned its attention to the west bank , where it has no political authority .
+it has called on palestinians there to launch a new intifada against israel , even while insisting on calm in the gaza strip .
+fatah , which runs the west bank , wants no part of another palestinian uprising .
+president mahmoud abbas has made no secret of his objection to such a strategy .
+but , with their government unable to do anything about the expansion of israeli settlements , including in east jerusalem , as well as continued conflicts over holy sites in hebron , bethlehem , and the al-aksa mosque , west bank palestinians are extremely frustrated .
+recent street demonstrations could easily turn into an outbreak of ongoing resistance to israeli rule .
+the palestinian authority , which runs the west bank , is afraid that a popular , non - violent intifada might quickly turn violent .
+if so , israel might use it as a pretext to crush the palestinians and their newly built institutions .
+this has happened before , during the last intifada in 2002 .
+there is another scenario that also terrifies fatah leaders .
+an outbreak of violence could strengthen hamas and its military wing , al-qassam brigades , in the west bank .
+this , in turn , could produce a repeat of the scenario that brought hamas to power in gaza in june 2007 , when all fatah authority in the area collapsed after the israeli withdrawal .
+yet the peace process has been stalled for more than a year , greatly reducing fatah 's credibility in the west bank .
+abbas has repeatedly described peace as a strategic choice for the palestinians .
+but , 17 years since the signing of the oslo agreement and the launch of bilateral talks between the palestine liberation organization and israel , there has been very little movement toward a palestinian state .
+in popular opinion , negotiations have reached a dead end .
+arab diplomats also show few signs of optimism .
+at its recent summit in libya , the arab league rejected the proximity talks proposed by the united states ' middle east peace envoy , george mitchell .
+the arab position is that no proximity talks can be held until israel freezes its settlement activity in the west bank and east jerusalem .
+palestinian and arab opinion is waiting for the us , as israel 's ally , to intervene and press for concessions .
+though the palestinian economy in the west bank has improved greatly under prime minister salam fayyad , this is no substitute for serious peace negotiations .
+in august 2009 , fayyad declared his vision of a palestinian state in two years .
+under his blueprint , which has received strong financial support from the us and the european union , the political , economic , and security infrastructure of the palestinian state would be ready by august 2011 .
+fayyad has also gained the backing of fatah and most other palestinian groups in the west bank .
+fayyad 's strategy for international recognition of a palestinian state is to fight a legal battle against israel in the united nations security council and other international bodies .
+he is convinced that establishing a palestinian state would serve the interest of all parties , and that the odds favor the palestinians in international political struggle .
+hamas does not share this view , and palestinian reconciliation efforts have reached an impasse .
+the arab league has given egypt the lead role in bringing the two sides together , but hamas has spurned egypt 's proposals .
+now , with questions about president hosni mubarak 's successor in the air , egypt has put aside these talks .
+palestinians are looking instead to iran , hamas ' ally , for signs of any revival in discussions between fatah and hamas .
+palestinians ' choices are limited , and there is no consensus among them on how to proceed .
+but there is a growing sense that the waiting game cannot last much longer . whatever comes next will most likely come soon .
+the time is now to fight disease
+it is possible for a child born just ten years from now to live in a world where aids , tuberculosis and malaria are on the wane .
+but this can only happen with considerable investment .
+now . otherwise , today 's grim picture will only get worse .
+each day , these diseases kill 16,000 people—devastating entire communities and plummeting countries deeper into poverty .
+upping the ante could turn the tables .
+recent successes in brazil against aids , in mozambique against malaria , and in china against tb , show what can be achieved on a global scale with more resources .
+there are new ways of directing aid to where it is most needed .
+created in 2002 as a partnership between governments and civil society , the global fund is unique in the way it aims to deliver assistance .
+driven by real needs on the ground , projects are designed and implemented by recipients , and its procedures and operations are transparent .
+of late there has been much talk about intensifying efforts to eradicate poverty .
+ahead of the g8 summit in scotland in july , a coalition of non - governmental organizations has launched the " global call to action against poverty , " and the uk host has made africa a top priority .
+building on this momentum , the campaigns for debt relief , trade reform , and increasing aid to poor countries have gained traction .
+yet , while pledges to increase development assistance have soared , short - term funding is woefully inadequate .
+any strategy for raising living standards must include urgent measures that address aids , tb and malaria .
+stemming the spread of this deadly trio of diseases is the linchpin in the global fight against poverty .
+unchecked , these diseases not only sap the strength of national economies , but jeopardize peace and security .
+teachers and nurses are dying ; police and security forces are being hard hit , and 14 million children have already been orphaned by aids .
+we now risk failing to meet the millennium development goal , set out by the united nations , of reversing the spread of aids , tb and malaria by 2015 .
+this failure will make remote any hope of reaching the other millennium goals in the fight against poverty .
+a comprehensive response to aids , tb and malaria is needed .
+acting now means less spending in the long run .
+investments in effective prevention , treatment and research in 2005 and 2006 will save millions of lives , lessen the socio - economic impact of the diseases in poorer countries , and remove the need for increased spending on these chronic crises in the future .
+the global fund plays an important role in this funding environment , providing approximately 66% of all current external funds in the fight against tb , 45% in the fight against malaria , and 20% of all external support to combat hiv / aids .
+since the global fund was founded three years ago , it has built an impressive track record : approving 310 grants totaling $ 3.1 billion in 127 countries and disbursing $ 920 million since 2002 .
+despite the scope of its mission , it has a minimal bureaucracy , which allows for a flexible response to changing needs .
+the global fund is not perfect ; as with all new organizations , it is experiencing growing pains .
+yet , issues such as procurement policies , trade - offs between efficiency and ownership , and the balance between government and non - governmental organizations as implementing partners are being addressed through the fund 's open and inclusive governance systems .
+if the fund is to live up to its potential it will need $ 2.3 billion to continue its work effectively in 2005 .
+the first of two replenishment conferences for the global fund is taking place this week in stockholm , with the aim of securing financial pledges to cover grant commitments in 2006-2007 , as well as to fill the gap for this year .
+donors have long preached the importance of a funding vehicle such as the global fund—one that is needs - driven , relies on local input , and promotes donor coordination .
+they now have a chance to make good on their word .
+with many battles ahead in the fight against aids , tb and malaria , it would be a disgrace if this opportunity is squandered .
+the promise of euro - atlantic missile defense
+brussels -- the new strategic arms reduction treaty ( start ) that russian president dmitri medvedev and us president barack obama just signed in prague is an historic achievement , and an inspiration for further progress in global arms control . but at the same time , here and now , we must also prepare to defend against another , less encouraging trend .
+the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is a threat to both the nato allies and russia .
+a look at current trends shows that more than 30 countries have or are developing missile capabilities .
+in many cases , these missiles could eventually threaten europe 's populations and territories .
+iran is a case in point .
+it has signed the nuclear non - proliferation treaty , and is developing a nuclear program that it claims is for civilian purposes only .
+but iran has gone far beyond what is necessary for a purely civilian program . it has concealed several nuclear facilities from the international atomic energy agency , played hide - and - seek with the international community , and rejected all offers of cooperation from the united states , the european union , and others .
+most recently , iran 's government announced plans to enrich its uranium to levels that appear incompatible with civilian use and that defy several united nations security council resolutions .
+iran also has an extensive missile development program . iranian officials declare that the range of their modified shahab - 3 missiles is 2,000 kilometers , putting allied countries such as turkey , greece , romania , and bulgaria within reach .
+in february 2009 , iran introduced the safir 2 space launch vehicle .
+this is a key stage in the development of intermediate - and intercontinental - range missiles .
+if iran completes this development , the whole of europe , as well as all of russia , would be within its range .
+proliferators must know that the nato allies are unwavering in their commitment to collective defense , including nuclear deterrence .
+confronted with the spread of missile technology , and unpredictable regimes and leaders , we owe it to our populations to complement our deterrence capabilities with an effective missile - defense capability .
+we are not starting from scratch .
+nato allies have been looking at various missile - defense options for some time .
+nato itself is developing protections for our deployed troops .
+but with the new us approach to missile defense , there are now much better opportunities for an effective nato - wide system that would enhance the territorial defense of our populations and nations .
+a true joint euro - atlantic missile defense would demonstrate nato 's collective will , not only to defend against the new threats of today and tomorrow , but also to send a clear message that there is nothing to be gained from missile proliferation .
+it can also provide an opportunity for europeans to demonstrate again to the us their willingness to invest in self - defense capabilities , and to play an active role in a process that , until now , has been conducted largely over their heads , by the us and russia .
+but there is another reason for developing missile defense : to create a new dynamic in european and euro - atlantic security .
+there is much talk these days about the euro - atlantic security architecture .
+russia , in particular , has focused on treaties , conferences , and political arrangements .
+clearly , these things can be useful and important .
+we should talk .
+we should look for common political approaches , many of which we have already agreed , and could easily endorse again .
+but , to my mind , a joint security architecture must move beyond blueprints .
+it needs to be built .
+and missile defense is a concrete way to do that .
+in this respect , the news that the us and russia have agreed on a follow - up treaty to start that will substantially cut both countries ' nuclear arsenals provides a good backdrop .
+this new agreement makes the world safer , and it will give impetus to cooperation with russia in other fields , particularly nato - russia relations .
+since taking office last summer , i have invested considerable time and effort in revitalizing the nato - russia relationship , with progress made in several areas , including a joint review of common threats and challenges .
+but it is time to look at missile defense as another opportunity to bring us together .
+we need a missile - defense system that includes not just all nato countries , but russia , too .
+the more that missile defense is seen as a shared security roof -- built , supported , and operated together -- that protects us all , the more people from vancouver to vladivostok will know that they are part of one community .
+such a security roof would be a strong political symbol that russia is fully part of the euro - atlantic family , sharing the costs and benefits .
+of course , there are practical challenges .
+we would have to make our systems interoperable , share intelligence assessments , and link sensitive technologies .
+but such cooperation is a concrete way to build mutual trust and confidence .
+for these reasons , the time has come to move forward on missile defense .
+we need a decision , by nato 's next summit in november , that missile defense is an alliance mission , and that we will explore every opportunity to cooperate with russia .
+but russia also must decide to view missile defense as an opportunity , rather than a threat .
+if that happens , we can move forward to create a missile - defense system that not only defends the euro - atlantic community , but that also brings it together .
+the end of the cold war has given us an enormous opportunity to achieve our goal of a europe whole , free , and at peace .
+we are not quite there , but we are getting there . missile defense can be part of that positive trend .
+a new beginning for nato and russia
+brussels -- when i gave my first public speech as secretary general of nato just over a year ago , i focused on the nato - russia relationship , because i believe it is crucial for global , not just european , security .
+at that time , i thought the relationship to be in urgent need of repair , and that nato and russia should make a " new beginning . "
+so i made several specific proposals for laying the foundations of a far more productive future relationship .
+a year on , how do we measure up ?
+we have , first of all , reinforced our practical cooperation in a range of areas .
+beyond increasing our practical collaboration , we have rejuvenated the nato - russia council , and have broadened and deepened our dialogue over the past year .
+while these discussions have not led us to see eye - to - eye on all issues , they have certainly helped to build a greater degree of mutual trust and confidence , which will certainly benefit our future cooperation .
+the same is true of our joint review of common security challenges , which has progressed extremely well , with agreement on five threats and challenges that call for enhanced cooperation : terrorism , afghanistan , piracy , proliferation of weapons of mass destruction , and natural and man - made disasters .
+we are already fleshing out the details on appropriate practical projects to be undertaken together .
+the nato - russia relationship has also progressed in other areas .
+nato has been fully transparent with russia on the development of the alliance 's new strategic concept , which i hope will encourage similar transparency from our russian partners as they develop their own strategic documents .
+nato has also taken the initiative on overcoming the deadlock on the treaty on conventional forces in europe , which promises to strengthen conventional arms control and transparency .
+taken together , these achievements show that a new beginning in nato - russia relations has indeed been established .
+but my optimism about the future of our relationship does not blind me to the difficulties that remain .
+the nato allies still have concerns about georgia , where fundamental differences of principle are at stake .
+russia , too , continues to have concerns -- for example , over nato 's open door policy .
+i believe that these worries are misplaced , and that nato enlargement has enhanced security and stability for russia .
+despite these remaining differences , we should have enough confidence to set out an ambitious agenda for the future .
+one of our priorities should be to enhance our operational cooperation .
+back in the 1990 's , we worked together with great success to stabilize the balkans .
+i would like to see more joint peacekeeping operations , not only on land , but also at sea to enhance maritime security -- in particular , greater cooperation in our efforts to combat piracy in the gulf of aden .
+moreover , our operational cooperation in afghanistan could be stepped up .
+russian donations to the afghan national army could make a huge difference to the afghans ' ability to ensure their own security , which is in the interest of us all .
+but it is in the area of missile defense that i see the greatest potential for enhancing the nato - russia relationship .
+earlier this year , in light of the growing threat of proliferation of nuclear capabilities and ballistic missiles , i proposed a common " security roof " stretching from vancouver to vladivostok .
+i hope that in the coming months and years we will have the political will to make this a reality -- a reality underpinned by nato - russia cooperation on missile defense .
+a healthy nato - russia relationship is vital to the security of us all .
+now that a solid foundation for it is in place , together we can look to the future with renewed confidence and ambition .
+i will do everything in my power to ensure that we fulfill the tremendous potential that the nato - russia relationship holds , and i count on the support of all members of the nato - russia council for achieving this goal .
+europe 's defense investment gap
+foreign policy disputes between europe , france in particular , and the us are mounting , and not only over the israeli - palestinian bloodbath and the conduct of the anti - terrorism war .
+but europe 's criticisms , no matter how sound , will not be taken seriously by the us so long as the continent continues to free - ride on america 's defenses , something it has done for half - a - century .
+in a bellicose world , a credible voice in the international arena requires a creditable military capability and high - tech military technology .
+in both , europe is lacking .
+america 's irritation with some of its european allies - tony blair 's uk being the noticeable exception - is understandable .
+in the current fiscal year , the us will spend an additional $ 50 billion on defense , raising its overall defense bill to $ 379 billion , more than 3% of gdp .
+this sum is , in fact , low by post - wwii standards .
+at the time of the gulf war of 1991 , us defense spending was 4.8% of gdp ; it was far higher in the 1950s and 1960s .
+europe 's commitment to defense tells another story .
+defense spending is 1.6% of gdp in germany , 2% in italy , and 1.5% in spain ; only france and the uk reach 3% .
+but confining discussion about defense commitment to the percent of gdp spent on the military is insufficient because there are economies of scale in defense spending .
+so one would expect that smaller countries will spend proportionally more on defense than larger ones .
+instead , today america alone spends more than most of its nato allies combined , and defense spending in the us is likely to increase even more in the years to come .
+security and global influence are not the only benefits that come through military expenditure .
+about 10-15% of us military spending finances basic research and thus provides a powerful boost to america 's high - tech research and development .
+the internet , based on thinking and spending made in the 1940 's , and the silicon chip , developed in the 1970 's , are both products of research funded by the pentagon .
+the war in afghanistan , which was truly revolutionary in the way it was conducted , proves how new information and communication technology can bring about success with a minimal number of men on the ground and minimal losses .
+the russians fought for ten hard years over the same terrain in afghanistan .
+lacking comparable technology , they lost tens of thousands of men and were eventually defeated .
+at the beginning of the afghan campaign many military " experts " feared that the us would face a similar fate .
+how wrong they were !
+europe lags behind the us in r&d , and its stinginess over defense contributes mightily to a growing high tech " investment gap . "
+data concerning patents documents america 's advantage : in the late 1990s 56% of all global patents in high - tech fields was granted to us applicants , only 11% to eu applicants .
+the connection between r&d and growth is too obvious to doubt that europe 's sluggish economies are a direct result of european backwardness at innovation - and that this in turn may reflect the absence of critical military spending to drive investments in research and development .
+the ongoing dispute between europe and the us over the choice of the military transport plane - to be used to deploy the new 60,000 strong european rapid reaction force - is symptomatic of europe 's problems .
+america would like europe to opt for an aircraft built by boeing and lockheed martin . europe is divided : some countries , notably italy , support the us ; others , notably france and germany , argue in favor of a european plane built by airbus in a $ 15 billion publicly funded project .
+this is an issue on which europe should stand up to the us .
+the eu should fund the airbus project and make sure that an important fraction of the money goes into r&d to foster the growth of an industry that is one of the few european high - tech success stories .
+but where should the funds needed to pay for this huge investment come from ?
+in recent weeks european defense ministers suggested that increases in military expenditures should be excluded from the budget constraints imposed by the euro stability pact .
+the idea that a sharp increase in military spending in a ( hopefully temporarily ) bellicose world should be amortized with some deficits is consistent with sound economic policy , but only if the rest of the budget remains " lean . "
+this is the case in america , where nobody really worries if increased military spending will create a temporary deficit .
+not in europe .
+an increase in military spending , in conjunction with an enforcement of the stability pact , should bring about a trimming of the non - defense budget : the public sector wage bill and a welfare state grown far beyond the goal of supporting the incomes of the poor , would of necessity need to be trimmed sharply .
+for half - a - century europe has relied on the us for security , while spending its own money on a pricey welfare state .
+this can no longer continue - at least not if the eu is serious about playing a leading role in the world .
+argentina : open up or shut down
+" i have an important political mission , " eduardo amadeo said on being appointed argentina 's ambassador to washington . " i must explain our transition . "
+but diplomatic explanations are not what argentina needs .
+it does not need to waste scarce money on diplomacy of dubious value -- not when the country lacks an agency dedicated to helping argentine businessmen sell their goods abroad .
+indeed , the sum argentina spends on its diplomats is what tiny ireland spends on its export promotion agency , an institution argentina never bothered to create .
+instead of talking to fellow diplomats , argentina 's ambassador to the us should talk to us supermarkets , convincing their managers to buy argentine goods and arranging for them to meet with small businessmen from his country .
+he should not be duplicating what argentina 's president and foreign minister are capable of doing .
+export diplomacy is important , but export promotion , visiting stores and talking to buyers , is even more vital .
+european grocery shops are full of products from israel , but how often do you see argentine beef or other goods ?
+argentina 's economy opened up significantly in recent years , notwithstanding a strong exchange rate , which made exporting difficult .
+total exports doubled in 1991-2001 , from us$ 12 billion to $ 25 billion , with industrial exports growing from $ 3 billion to $ 8 billion .
+but the numbers remain very small .
+in fact , argentina is amazingly closed for an economy its size .
+exports do not exceed 10% of gdp , and manufactured goods account for only about a third of total exports .
+brazil , a country eight times the size , exports 12% of its economy 's output , and 57% of brazilian exports are manufactured goods .
+chile exports almost 30% of its output .
+some small european countries come close to 50% .
+little wonder , then , that argentina 's current crisis is so harsh : the portion of its economy that can generate the export revenues necessary to repay foreign debt is too small .
+when a country reaches the point that it needs all its exports to service its national debt , and the size of the export sector is fixed , nothing is left to pay for imports .
+so imports dry up and the economy stops .
+the more open an economy is , the more easily it can avoid this trap .
+of course , all countries eventually overcome crises .
+the question is how .
+argentina now faces a choice that is both economic and political .
+the path of development that it chooses as it emerges from its crisis will determine the country 's future for many years to come .
+so it is surprising that this choice is not at the center of the political debate in the campaign for the presidency now underway .
+there are two ways out of the current morass .
+one is the old model : a recovery in real wages and a resumption of consumption .
+viewed from the despairing perspective of today 's crisis , this model seems like a dream .
+but if it is implemented , in 3-5 years argentina will look exactly like the country we have always known : a largely closed economy that remains dangerously vulnerable to external shocks .
+the alternative is to capitalize on the unique opportunity that this year 's devaluation of the peso offers by making the competitiveness gains last long enough to shift resources into the export sector .
+of course , this will depress real wages and consumption , because the rise in peso revenues will be used instead to finance the investment needed to expand the export sector .
+this will lead to the creation of new firms and the retooling of existing ones to make them fit to export .
+eventually productivity gains in a larger export sector will drive up real wages and consumption .
+in short , argentina 's economy must open up or risk shutting down .
+by keeping the price of public services frozen , the government would win on two fronts : inflation would be held in check and altered incentives would shift investment from the domestic sector towards exporting firms .
+in the old model returns come quicker , but the long - term implications are gloomy , because the economy would remain saddled with the same problems it has confronted for decades .
+the alternative is to look forward and asks what type of country argentines want to leave to future generations .
+there should be no doubt as to the answer to this question , except in the minds of politicians who fail to raise it because they refuse to think beyond the coming presidential election .
+perhaps it is not by chance that argentina has the largest number of psychology students in the world .
+if you are a closed and inward - looking country , you are bound to need lots of psychologists .
+the minister for education would do her country a profound service if she were to re - allocate resources to courses designed to train export promoters .
+teach young people some basic marketing skills and then send them out to argentina 's embassies .
+they will work wonders , unlike the cheap talk of ambassador amadeo at washington dinner tables .
+the big bang of economic freedom
+why is it so difficult to implement the deregulation needed to make an economy more competitive ?
+why do so many governments try to achieve this end , and why do almost all of them fail ?
+all citizens stand to benefit from competitive markets for products and services , but more often than not , the broad coalition required to sustain pro - competitive policies never materializes ; political support simply is n't there .
+why ?
+this question is important not only in transition economies and other emerging market countries , but in rich countries as well -- in fact almost everywhere , except possibly the us and the uk , which long ago embarked on a process of radical and far - reaching economic liberalization .
+new zealand and ireland followed suit and their economies have been booming ever since .
+lack of competition is typically due to over - regulation .
+taxicabs in european cities are expensive because the number of licenses is strictly controlled .
+with market entry blocked , license owners face little pressure to hold down fares , and the officials who allocate licenses are well placed to collect votes or bribes .
+in short , regulation tends to distort incentives , stimulating what economists call rent - seeking behavior : the taxi driver and the license official collect unearned premiums ( rents ) solely because they can exploit their position as insiders , not because they are more productive .
+notaries are another example of this phenomenon .
+public notaries in many countries charge extremely high fees for services that are virtually useless .
+fees are high because the notaries themselves control access to their profession .
+without government regulation ( including rules requiring that consumers purchase their useless services ) , public notaries would not have the position from which they draw rents .
+examples of the benefits of deregulation abound .
+the taxi market in ireland is deregulated , and fares there are cheap .
+for some time after us airlines were deregulated , the five - hour flight from new york to los angeles cost much less than the half - hour trip from zurich to frankfurt .
+whereas regulation creates unearned rents for overprotected minorities ( taxi drivers , notaries , airline pilots , and telecom or electricity workers ) , deregulation reduces these rents and redistributes them to the general public .
+but because overprotected minorities enjoy privileged access to politicians , it is no surprise that deregulation incites so much fierce -- and effective -- opposition .
+public utilities are a good example of this .
+whenever a government attempts to liberalize the electricity industry , unions and firms join forces in opposition .
+workers and management oppose deregulation because openness to competition would eliminate their unearned premiums .
+the wages of electrical workers are high precisely because they have appropriated a part of the rents created in an uncompetitive electricity market .
+is there a way to weaken this opposition ?
+what if a government , instead of fighting the electricity industry alone , unleashed an economic " big bang , " trying to liberalize most markets at once ?
+but a plan to close numerous bases passed by an overwhelming majority when the congressional leadership finally agreed to present a single list of bases to be closed ; the list could only be voted up or down , without any possibility of amendments .
+the cause of economic liberalization would be greatly advanced by adopting similar strategies .
+for example , electricity workers would realize that , as consumers , their gains from lower prices throughout the economy more than compensate them for the loss of rents in their own firms .
+the big bang approach gives workers a stake in liberalization and thus makes deregulation politically easier to pursue .
+deregulating product markets has an additional benefit : it facilitates liberalization of the labor market .
+evidence gathered by the oecd shows a strong positive correlation across countries between the degree of competition in the product market and the extent to which labor market regulations increase the powers of workers when they bargain with firms .
+bargaining is mostly about the distribution of excess rents between the firm and its workers .
+in a competitive industry , where there are no excess rents , there is little to bargain about .
+in some cases , however , regulation works in the opposite direction : it keeps the price of public services artificially low , rather than too high .
+this is true of railway fares throughout continental europe , which are subsidized by government .
+here again , winning the battle for deregulation requires convincing consumers that they stand to benefit .
+railway fares will be higher , but taxes will be lower , because only those who actually use trains will pay the costs , rather than the non - traveling taxpayers .
+deregulations of airlines and bus transportation will also create healthy competition for railroads and help keep prices from rising too far .
+piecemeal deregulation is doomed to fail .
+generating sufficient political support to enact reforms that can survive the opposition of vested interests requires attempting to deregulate the entire economy simultaneously , not select industries , one by one .
+the key to eliminating inefficient , unproductive subsidies to minorities is to implement tax reductions for all .
+europe 's university challenge
+the university systems in the us and continental europe could n't be more different .
+which works better ?
+the answer is clear : america 's by a long shot .
+european universities are generally based on three misguided principles :
+this system is supposedly more egalitarian than america 's system of higher education , which many europeans look down on as elitist .
+in reality , europe 's system typically produces less research , worse students ( especially at the doctoral level ) , and is probably less egalitarian than the us system .
+having taxpayers cover the costs of university education is indeed redistributive , but in the wrong direction -- the beneficiaries are most often the children of comfortable european families .
+even taking a generous view , the best that can be said is that the system is neutral insofar as redistribution is concerned , because the wealthiest pay more taxes and use more university services .
+in addition to favoring europe 's " haves , " this system makes it virtually impossible for self - financed private universities to survive .
+in fact , this is probably the true motivation of europe 's free public university system : to maintain the state 's monopoly on higher education .
+but consider , instead , the us system : students pay for their education and , with part of the tuition these students pay , universities finance scholarships for deserving but poor students .
+such a system is at least as " fair " as europe 's model , and probably more so than one in which taxpayers pay for everybody , including the rich .
+indeed , recent research comparing education in the us and italy finds that family income is more important in determining a student 's success ( measured in terms of his salary ) in " egalitarian " italy than it is in " elitist " america .
+but competition is as important as financing in determining a university 's quality , because competition increases the merit of the product .
+this is true in the us system , where public and private universities coexist happily .
+the university of california at berkeley is public . stanford university , an hour away down the coast , is private .
+both are among america 's finest universities .
+competition between them works because it involves fighting for the best students and offering scholarships to deserving poor ones .
+by contrast , europe 's centralization and bureaucratization control over universities produces only mediocrity .
+appointments in european universities are often governed by complex bureaucratic processes that involve countless " judges " chosen from all over a country .
+this process is supposedly designed to " guarantee " that the best are appointed .
+in reality , however , these judges make it easier for insiders to appoint their friends , rather than for the quality of research and teaching to determine who is hired .
+some countries , take france , are changing their systems by appointing a few academics from other countries onto hiring and promotion committees .
+while this is obviously a move in the right direction , it will produce few results .
+the best american universities operate their hiring processes internally , relying on outsiders only for expert opinions on the quality of a candidate professor 's research .
+what produces good appointments is the threat that mediocre professors will make it difficult to attract good students and large research grants .
+europe 's tendency to equalize salary and treatment of professors and researchers also reduces the incentive to engage in good research and good teaching .
+if the only factor that increases a professor 's salary is the passage of time , why make the extra effort to excel ?
+of course , love of research and teaching is why many people join university faculties in the first place , but why not give these noble sentiments a helping hand with appropriate financial incentives ?
+low salaries are often part of an implicit bargain : in exchange for the bad pay , university administrators close their eyes to lazy teaching and research .
+moreover , if salaries are low , how can university deans stop their faculty members from scouring the country to do lucrative consulting ?
+the result is bad teaching , lousy research , and absentee professors .